There is little doubt that the Egyptian revolution of January 2011 was a bust. The majority of people in Egypt probably believe so, regardless of how they feel about the regime of Mubarak. However, there is some controversy over whether the spectacular failure is just a phase or if it's a definitive result. The most cogent of these protestations is a messianic, generational argument for the inevitability of the success of the revolution. According to this argument, the revolution was a generational act, led by the youth of the country and opposed and hindered by the older generations. The youth leadership is almost entirely through street actions, and the old people hindering is almost exclusively through ballot choices. According to this theory, the success of the revolution is built-in in the rules of nature, as the current youth generation grows and the older generation dies out, the ideas of the revolution would automatically win just through sheer demographics. This is patently false because it ignores the realities of how voting happens in Egypt, it ignores the main reason for the failure of the revolution, and it ignores one critical fact: As youth grow they will also change.
Elections in Egypt are not very special. They are mostly about interests, and large sections vote as blocks. There is a definite individual swing vote, and there are some ideological votes, but it's mostly about interests. And that's no different from anywhere else really. Labor votes for, single issue vote, vote for lower taxes, etc. Egypt is no different except the vote tends to focus on local, tribal, or family interests. The revolutionary response to such interests was to delegitimize them and equate them with corruption, thus alienating millions without providing an alternative. Even the more sane voices among the revolution tried to enforce an alignment of said interests with western styled grand policy decisions, not through grassroots work, but through constant lecturing on talk shows that nobody watches. The end result was that the revolution created a conflict with the interests (often legitimate) of many, leading to the formation of the very expected feloolist trend in the Delta.
Despite all their sarcasm and protests to the opposite, the failure of activists to provide an alternative is an integral part of this end result. By creating a situation where assumptions about Egyptian realities are completely wrong, the revolutionary forces insisted that canned solutions from Eastern European transitions are universal and must work in Egypt. When such solutions were proven through reality, and experiments in the region (particularly Iraq), showed them to be disastrous; this was always portrayed as lack of political will. And immediately, reform efforts that again cannot be applied to Egypt were presented as readily and easily applicable. Solar energy was presented as a cheap and universally used power source. India's economic growth was presented while demanding that not a lick of coal be used in Egypt. China's boom was cited, but any mention of special economic zones in Egypt was immediately attacked. Brazil was, quite sardonically, presented as an example of economic equality.
The theory still stands though, as a comforting backup, that as the population ages, youth and thus the revolution will come to dominate. Yes, it is true that there is a generational divide in Egypt. It is not as sharp and decisive as the activists think, but it exists. Yes, a large portion of youth are pro revolution and a large portion of adults is pro reform. And yes some of the pro revolution youth are extremely young, many are teens. But I fail to see how this logically leads to an inevitable victory of revolution over reform. In fact, human experience seems to suggest a much simpler answer. Youth are revolutionary because they are youth, not because of anything particular about this generation. As they grow older, they will definitely become more conservative as they are exposed to more realities and responsibilities. They most definitely will not be identical to their parents, and they will cause a change in society and the government. However, their parents were not identical to their predecessors either. To assume that there is something innately different in the current generation of youth is pandering.
In a way, what Egypt has been going through and is still going through is a more retarded, more bloody, less productive version of the flower power phase of the sixties. Today's youth are probably going to vote for Egypt's Reagan in twenty years, and they are not going to particularly or inevitably transform Egypt into a socialist democratic liberal secular society.
Elections in Egypt are not very special. They are mostly about interests, and large sections vote as blocks. There is a definite individual swing vote, and there are some ideological votes, but it's mostly about interests. And that's no different from anywhere else really. Labor votes for, single issue vote, vote for lower taxes, etc. Egypt is no different except the vote tends to focus on local, tribal, or family interests. The revolutionary response to such interests was to delegitimize them and equate them with corruption, thus alienating millions without providing an alternative. Even the more sane voices among the revolution tried to enforce an alignment of said interests with western styled grand policy decisions, not through grassroots work, but through constant lecturing on talk shows that nobody watches. The end result was that the revolution created a conflict with the interests (often legitimate) of many, leading to the formation of the very expected feloolist trend in the Delta.
Despite all their sarcasm and protests to the opposite, the failure of activists to provide an alternative is an integral part of this end result. By creating a situation where assumptions about Egyptian realities are completely wrong, the revolutionary forces insisted that canned solutions from Eastern European transitions are universal and must work in Egypt. When such solutions were proven through reality, and experiments in the region (particularly Iraq), showed them to be disastrous; this was always portrayed as lack of political will. And immediately, reform efforts that again cannot be applied to Egypt were presented as readily and easily applicable. Solar energy was presented as a cheap and universally used power source. India's economic growth was presented while demanding that not a lick of coal be used in Egypt. China's boom was cited, but any mention of special economic zones in Egypt was immediately attacked. Brazil was, quite sardonically, presented as an example of economic equality.
The theory still stands though, as a comforting backup, that as the population ages, youth and thus the revolution will come to dominate. Yes, it is true that there is a generational divide in Egypt. It is not as sharp and decisive as the activists think, but it exists. Yes, a large portion of youth are pro revolution and a large portion of adults is pro reform. And yes some of the pro revolution youth are extremely young, many are teens. But I fail to see how this logically leads to an inevitable victory of revolution over reform. In fact, human experience seems to suggest a much simpler answer. Youth are revolutionary because they are youth, not because of anything particular about this generation. As they grow older, they will definitely become more conservative as they are exposed to more realities and responsibilities. They most definitely will not be identical to their parents, and they will cause a change in society and the government. However, their parents were not identical to their predecessors either. To assume that there is something innately different in the current generation of youth is pandering.
In a way, what Egypt has been going through and is still going through is a more retarded, more bloody, less productive version of the flower power phase of the sixties. Today's youth are probably going to vote for Egypt's Reagan in twenty years, and they are not going to particularly or inevitably transform Egypt into a socialist democratic liberal secular society.
