Much has been said about the turnout and results of the 2014 constitution referendum in Egypt. Different sides try to make different arguments, numbers are twisted and turned, conclusions are forcibly extracted, and correlation is assumed where there is none. In this post I'll try to present a few facts. I am not going to claim a neutral position, I am biased, but I am not going to lie about the numbers. First though, we have to agree that the election was held in a free manner. Fairness is a different issue and I know that there are questions about it, but there is no question at least that the yes vote was not going to be much different under any circumstances. So, the facts.
The number of people who turned out for this referendum was the largest in the history of Egyptian referendums.
Turnout ratio was smaller than the March 2011 referendum only because the 2011 voter database dropped 10 million voters. March 2011 was the first exercise in voting after the January revolution and the only method of assuring no multiple votes was ink.
The number of people who voted yes on this referendum is the largest number of people who picked ANYTHING in a vote after the January 2011 revolution. Be it a yes or no answer to a referendum, a presidential candidate, or a political party.
The major comparison is with the December 2012 referendum on the MB drafted constitution though. And this is where things get interesting. In the 2014 referendum more people turned out to vote than in 2012. More interestingly, more people voted yes in the 2014 referendum than people turned out to vote in the 2012 referendum.
Percentage increase in voter turnout is calculated as: (Voters in 2014-Voters in 2012)*100/Voters in 2012. The trend shows increase in voter turnout in 21 provinces and decrease in 6 provinces. The decrease is slight (less than 10%) in three provinces and significant in the other three.
The most dramatic increase is in South Sinai where there was a 249% increase in the number of voters turning out to vote. This is most likely due to to the fact that in 2014 out-of-province voters were allowed to vote as opposed to 2012. South Sinai is a province where most residents are not registered with the province. There are significant increases in almost the entirety of the Delta and in the single city provinces as well as the Suez Canal Zone.
In terms of yes votes, there was an increase in yes votes in 23 provinces and a noticeable drop in three provinces. Again, the trend is clear geographically. The Delta, Suez Canal Zone (less so Suez), and the two metropolitan provinces show dramatic increases while the south shows less increase. The drops occur only in Middle Egypt and in Matrouh. Again the highest percentage increase was in South Sinai with an insane 400% increase due to out of province allowance.
Overall, roughly four million more voters turned out to vote in 2014, raising the participation rate from 32% to 38%. The largest contributors by far to voter turnout in terms of absolute number are the Delta provinces where Daqahliya alone contributes over 700,000 new voters. Cairo is also a province where a significant number of new voters were introduced. In terms of absolute numbers some smaller provinces do not appear as dramatic even though their percentage increase is significant. Of particular note is North Sinai where both more people showed up to vote and more people voted yes than 2012. Given the security situation in Northern Sinai this is a feat for both the people and the security services in the province.
Overall 9.4 million Yes votes were added between 2012 and 2014, roughly 90% increase. The largest contributor is Cairo, the list of contributors then pretty much matches the list of contributors of new votes, with the Delta contributing more than the South and four provinces representing Middle Egypt and Matrouh having a negative balance.
Analysing the numbers is a tough process, and I don't think anyone has enough information to make solid conclusions. However, I can make a few remarks.
In the Delta, there is a very strong anti-MB vote that started before the election of Morsi, continued through the referendum on the MB drafted constitution and seems to be picking steam still. This is very dramatic given the Delta is a region where the MB traditionally had a very solid base. Gharbiya in particular is a case study, from an MB stronghold to a province that solidly contributes as many votes as possible in the opposite direction to the MB.
The Suez Canal Zone is not much different from the Delta. However, as the demographics of Suez include more upper Egyptians, there is less opposition to the MB there, and thus less increase in voter turnout and yes votes (although still an increase).
Upper Egypt was expected to vote less enthusiastically than under Morsi. This was not the case. Although turnout ratios in upper Egypt are still very low compared to the Delta, all provinces of upper Egypt proper (Sohag, Qena, Luxor, and Aswan) showed an increase in both turnout and yes votes. The same applies to Asyut. Luxor and Aswan might be easily explained through the tourist worker vote. Asyut and Sohag are more difficult to explain. More Coptic turnout could be a contributor, but there isn't even anecdotal evidence that it did happen.
Cairo is a very important data point. Cairo is the third contributor to increased turnout. Boycott calls kept an eye on Cairo as a measure of how much the boycott would work. Cairo is a city/province where most of the revolutionary core of Egypt resides. The increase in turnout means either the boycott didn't work, or their was significant replacement of voting demographics. The dramatic increase in yes votes (over 1.5 million) is readily explained by Cairo being one of a few provinces to vote strongly against the MB constitution in 2012.
A couple of observations: Provinces where tourism is a main source of income turned out in larger numbers and voted yes in larger number than 2012, even where the province is traditionally conservative and more likely to side with Islamists. Provinces with large scale MB "protests" and provinces where terrorist attacks occurred also turned out and voted in much larger numbers than 2012.
The provinces that showed relatively less satisfaction in 2014 compared to 2012 in terms of turnout and yes votes (note that all of them still voted yes overwhelmingly) were Minya, Fayoum, Beni Suef, and Matrouh. Matrouh is an extremely small population province. The vote is mostly bedwin. The vote is also ideologically aligned with the MB. Lower turnout (highest percentage decrease) may mean an exit from political life or an inability of the Salafists to muster support. Why this didn't affect the Bedwin vote in the Sinai may have to do with the fact that Matrouh has had virtually no terrorist attacks or MB protests or marches. The province seems to have depoliticised.
Minya and Beni Suef saw noticeable decrease in voter turnout. However, interestingly Beni Suef saw no decrease in yes votes. This is indicative because Minya is supposed to have higher Christian votes than Beni Suef. This could be an indicator that Christian votes did not turn out, especially in the south.
The main province where there seems to be very noticeable dissatisfaction with the 2014 constitution is Fayum. Mind you this dissatisfaction can only be gleaned through a study of relative decrease in turnout and yes votes, but the yes vote was still dominant. Fayum may not be a huge surprise since it is the ideological capital of political Islamism just as Menoufiya is the ideological capital of the Egyptian technocracy.
Overall, the Delta and the two metropolitan provinces where the overwhelming majority of Egyptians live show significantly more excitement for the 2014 constitution than they did in 2012. Upper Egypt (proper) is surprisingly better than 2012 mainly due to tourist worker votes. Middle Egypt shows relative dissatisfaction and probably little Christian turnout. North Sinai shows a heroic increase in voting. South Sinai is the main beneficiary from out-of-province voting. And Matrouh is probably exiting the political scene as the power of Salafists to mobilise did not materialise.
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