A tale of two referendums

Much has been said about the turnout and results of the 2014 constitution referendum in Egypt. Different sides try to make different arguments, numbers are twisted and turned, conclusions are forcibly extracted, and correlation is assumed where there is none. In this post I'll try to present a few facts. I am not going to claim a neutral position, I am biased, but I am not going to lie about the numbers. First though, we have to agree that the election was held in a free manner. Fairness is a different issue and I know that there are questions about it, but there is no question at least that the yes vote was not going to be much different under any circumstances. So, the facts.

The number of people who turned out for this referendum was the largest in the history of Egyptian referendums.

Turnout ratio was smaller than the March 2011 referendum only because the 2011 voter database dropped 10 million voters. March 2011 was the first exercise in voting after the January revolution and the only method of assuring no multiple votes was ink.

The number of people who voted yes on this referendum is the largest number of people who picked ANYTHING in a vote after the January 2011 revolution. Be it a yes or no answer to a referendum, a presidential candidate, or a political party.

The major comparison is with the December 2012 referendum on the MB drafted constitution though. And this is where things get interesting. In the 2014 referendum more people turned out to vote than in 2012. More interestingly, more people voted yes in the 2014 referendum than people turned out to vote in the 2012 referendum.

Percentage increase in voter turnout is calculated as: (Voters in 2014-Voters in 2012)*100/Voters in 2012. The trend shows increase in voter turnout in 21 provinces and decrease in 6 provinces. The decrease is slight (less than 10%) in three provinces and significant in the other three.

The most dramatic increase is in South Sinai where there was a 249% increase in the number of voters turning out to vote. This is most likely due to to the fact that in 2014 out-of-province voters were allowed to vote as opposed to 2012. South Sinai is a province where most residents are not registered with the province. There are significant increases in almost the entirety of the Delta and in the single city provinces as well as the Suez Canal Zone. 

In terms of yes votes, there was an increase in yes votes in 23 provinces and a noticeable drop in three provinces. Again, the trend is clear geographically. The Delta, Suez Canal Zone (less so Suez), and the two metropolitan provinces show dramatic increases while the south shows less increase. The drops occur only in Middle Egypt and in Matrouh. Again the highest percentage increase was in South Sinai with an insane 400% increase due to out of province allowance.

Overall, roughly four million more voters turned out to vote in 2014, raising the participation rate from 32% to 38%. The largest contributors by far to voter turnout in terms of absolute number are the Delta provinces where Daqahliya alone contributes over 700,000 new voters. Cairo is also a province where a significant number of new voters were introduced. In terms of absolute numbers some smaller provinces do not appear as dramatic even though their percentage increase is significant. Of particular note is North Sinai where both more people showed up to vote and more people voted yes than 2012. Given the security situation in Northern Sinai this is a feat for both the people and the security services in the province. 

Overall 9.4 million Yes votes were added between 2012 and 2014, roughly 90% increase. The largest contributor is Cairo, the list of contributors then pretty much matches the list of contributors of new votes, with the Delta contributing more than the South and four provinces representing Middle Egypt and Matrouh having a negative balance.

Analysing the numbers is a tough process, and I don't think anyone has enough information to make solid conclusions. However, I can make a few remarks.

In the Delta, there is a very strong anti-MB vote that started before the election of Morsi, continued through the referendum on the MB drafted constitution and seems to be picking steam still. This is very dramatic given the Delta is a region where the MB traditionally had a very solid base. Gharbiya in particular is a case study, from an MB stronghold to a province that solidly contributes as many votes as possible in the opposite direction to the MB.

The Suez Canal Zone is not much different from the Delta. However, as the demographics of Suez include more upper Egyptians, there is less opposition to the MB there, and thus less increase in voter turnout and yes votes (although still an increase).

Upper Egypt was expected to vote less enthusiastically than under Morsi. This was not the case. Although turnout ratios in upper Egypt are still very low compared to the Delta, all provinces of upper Egypt proper (Sohag, Qena, Luxor, and Aswan) showed an increase in both turnout and yes votes. The same applies to Asyut. Luxor and Aswan might be easily explained through the tourist worker vote. Asyut and Sohag are more difficult to explain. More Coptic turnout could be a contributor, but there isn't even anecdotal evidence that it did happen.

Cairo is a very important data point. Cairo is the third contributor to increased turnout. Boycott calls kept an eye on Cairo as a measure of how much the boycott would work. Cairo is a city/province where most of the revolutionary core of Egypt resides. The increase in turnout means either the boycott didn't work, or their was significant replacement of voting demographics. The dramatic increase in yes votes (over 1.5 million) is readily explained by Cairo being one of a few provinces to vote strongly against the MB constitution in 2012.

A couple of observations: Provinces where tourism is a main source of income turned out in larger numbers and voted yes in larger number than 2012, even where the province is traditionally conservative and more likely to side with Islamists. Provinces with large scale MB "protests" and provinces where terrorist attacks occurred also turned out and voted in much larger numbers than 2012.

The provinces that showed relatively less satisfaction in 2014 compared to 2012 in terms of turnout and yes votes (note that all of them still voted yes overwhelmingly) were Minya, Fayoum, Beni Suef, and Matrouh. Matrouh is an extremely small population province. The vote is mostly bedwin. The vote is also ideologically aligned with the MB. Lower turnout (highest percentage decrease) may mean an exit from political life or an inability of the Salafists to muster support. Why this didn't affect the Bedwin vote in the Sinai may have to do with the fact that Matrouh has had virtually no terrorist attacks or MB protests or marches. The province seems to have depoliticised.

Minya and Beni Suef saw noticeable decrease in voter turnout. However, interestingly Beni Suef saw no decrease in yes votes. This is indicative because Minya is supposed to have higher Christian votes than Beni Suef. This could be an indicator that Christian votes did not turn out, especially in the south.

The main province where there seems to be very noticeable dissatisfaction with the 2014 constitution is Fayum. Mind you this dissatisfaction can only be gleaned through a study of relative decrease in turnout and yes votes, but the yes vote was still dominant. Fayum may not be a huge surprise since it is the ideological capital of political Islamism just as Menoufiya is the ideological capital of the Egyptian technocracy.

Overall, the Delta and the two metropolitan provinces where the overwhelming majority of Egyptians live show significantly more excitement for the 2014 constitution than they did in 2012. Upper Egypt (proper) is surprisingly better than 2012 mainly due to tourist worker votes. Middle Egypt shows relative dissatisfaction and probably little Christian turnout. North Sinai shows a heroic increase in voting. South Sinai is the main beneficiary from out-of-province voting. And Matrouh is probably exiting the political scene as the power of Salafists to mobilise did not materialise. 

محاسبة مجيدة خيانة

مناصري ثورة يناير بيتريقوا على نظريات المؤامرة اللي بتقول ان الثورة كانت مؤامرة. وانا معاهم. ماشي مفيش دليل حاسم ان الثورة على الأقل في بدايتها او في اغلب اللي نزلها كان فيها نية المؤامرة.

الغريب بس في الموضوع ان نفس الناس دي بتقول ان الثورة اتخانت وسرقت من الاخوان ومن العسكر ومن الفلول ومن الشعب ومن اي حد معدي من جنبهم في الشارع. وده في حد ذاته ايمان بمؤامرة كونية واسعة تتضمن أطراف متعددة ملهاش مصالح مشتركة كلها بتعمل اذ فجأة مع بعض عشان يخونوا الشباب الطاهر وثورته.

بينما الحقيقة واضحة وبسيطة للي عايز يشوفها. بس هي يمكن مؤذية. الثورة مولودة بأسباب فشلها ومش محتاجة حد يخونها هي مدمرة نفسها بنفسها.

ثورة يناير ثورة بلا أهداف محددة ولا قيادة واضحة ولا طرح لبديل.

اللي قدمته يناير هو مطالب بإسقاط أشياء وإقصاء أشخاص زائد شعار مبهم عن حرية وعدالة اجتماعية ما تمش تعريف أيه هم. ثورة يناير طلبت يوتوبيا ومقالتلناش نحققها ازاي. ولما يناير الأصلية اتزنقت في سؤال ايه هو البديل حولت الموضوع برمته لعملية فيها التار (تحت مسمى القصاص) هو الهدف والنهاية. وعزل أشخاص بناء على معايير غير معرفة لأنهم "فلول" هو المطالب.

في غياب اي أهداف او بديل مكانش مطلوب من الاخوان انهم ميحاولوش يبلعوا البلد في كرشهم. الاخوان مخانوش. هم لقوا اللي عمل تفضية الساحة ليهم قضيته. يبقى حرام لو رفسوا النعمة. الاخوان من اول يوم هدفهم دولة البنا الميليشياوية. كانوا عايزينها بالتدريج لكن النشطاء فضولهم السكة تماماً. وخلاف النشطاء مع الاخوان مش خلاف على شكل الدولة اللي بناها الاخوان، لكن خلاف ان الاخوان كان لازم يركزوا اكتر في "إقصاء الفلول" و "القصاص". يعني لو الاخوان كانوا "طهروا الداخلية" كان النشطاء هينبسطوا منهم، بغض النظر عن ان التطهير ده في الغالب كان هيبقى عبارة عن استبدال بعناصر موالية للاخوان.

احنا وصلنا لنفس النقطة تاني. نشطاء الثورة مش عاجبهم السيسي يمسك. معندهمش بديل. كالعادة عارفين مش عايزين ايه ومش عارفين عايزين ايه. وكالعادة هيدعوا انهم اتخانوا. محدش خانك يا ابني، انت اللي مش عارف عايز ايه.

الحاجة التانية امتى ممكن محاسبة يناير؟ مش المحاسبة من الحاجات المهمة؟ هل يناير معصومة؟

كلمات: اصل الثورة محكمتش اصل النظام لسه لم يسقط اصل الدولة العميقة اصل معرفش ايه مبقتش تأكل عيش. الاول قالك لا شفيق مبارك بيمليه من شمر الشيخ لازم رئيس وزراء من الثورة. مكنتش خالتي اللي اختارت زفت الطين عصام شرف، كان الميدان. ولما شرف عك عك تاريخي قلتوا لا يمثل الثورة.

لما مرسي اتقال عليه مرشح الثورة وكلكم وافقتوا ودعمتوه محدش ضربكم على أيديكم أنكم تقولوا كده. لما مرسي فشل فشل ثلاثي الأبعاد قلتوا مرسي لا يمثل الثورة.

طيب ايه رأيك منعتبرش ان الثورة حكمت الا لما تيجي حكومة كلها من الشباب وكلهم من اللي كانوا في الميدان في ال١٨ يوم؟ طيب ايه رأيك في حكومة قنديل الاخيرة؟ ما هي ينطبق عليها المعيارين دول بامتياز.

ايه؟

لا يمثلوا الثورة؟ طب مين بيمثل أمها؟ امتى نقدر نسأل يناير هي عملت ايه وليه؟

ممكن نسألها عن انها وصلت الاخوان للحكم. هتقولي لا اصل طنطاوي هو اللي سلمهم الحكم/ لا اصل مبارك هو اللي رعى الاخوان/ اصل الاخوان أصلا جزء من نظام مبارك.

طب ينفع نحاسبكم أنكم فضلتوا في الميدان عشان تطلعوا إرهابيين من السجون تحت مسمى الإفراج عن معتقلين. وإنكم قلتوا لازم كل الإرهابيين يرجعوا من بره لأنهم مصريين ولو الحكومة عندها ضدهم حاجة تقدمها؟ لا مينفعش؟

طب نسألكم على ايه امتى؟

يناير واقع وماضي. انا ضد الفلول اللي لسه عايشين في لحظة التنحي وكل همهم انهم يشمتوا في المترتب عن تنحي مبارك بالشكل ده. وممكن أتكلم معاك في يناير ونحاول نلاقيلها إيجابيات او مكاسب. ومؤمن تماماً ان اغلب اللي نزل كان نيته كويسة. إنما الحقيقة الموجة اللي انا شايف بدايتها بتاعت الابتزاز بالثورة المجيدة وانت ضدها ولا مش ضدها دي تبلوها وتشربوا ميتها.

طز في مجيدة بتاعتكم وإرهابها الفكري

Did January abort the true revolution?

What Egypt really needs is more freedom on the personal level. That has been Egypt's main illness for decades if not centuries. More freedoms does not entail more activists Tweeting, or more Leftists blogging from the AUC student union on MacBooks. Freedom is a more fundamental concept that entails education, illumination, and exposure. I believe that this kind of change is inevitable, but I also believe that it is debatable whether the January revolution has expedited, hindered, or even aborted for the time being this kind of change.

Egypt is a conformist and uniform society. Yes, there might be some semblance of local variation, there might be a much discussed sectarian rift, and there might be social classes with clear differences. But Egypt is as mono-cultural as they come. Everyone is expected to behave the same way, read the same things, watch the same shows, like the same stuff, start similar families, and lead similar lifestyles. If you are a middle class woman, you are expected to dress a certain specific way; an upper class woman, another very specific way. This transcends all lines in Egypt. The upper class is no less conservative (even if it appears on the surface to be more westernised) than the middle class. Christians are probably more conservative than Muslims in most situations.

What this leads to is a situation where innovation is stifled. You have to follow a path prescribed to you by society since birth. If your scores in high school exit exams are good, there is no way in hell you can pursue your dream and talent of being a pianist. If you want to marry a girl you like who is outside your social niche, you can rest assured that the social backlash will be so consistent and ferocious that the relationship will fail. This translates into a deep social belief in lack of freedom at all levels, lack of social freedoms, lack of economic freedoms, lack of academic freedoms, and lack of artistic freedoms.

But this was definitely on its way to change. In 2010, it seemed that Egypt was definitely not the same. The upper middle class was growing so steadily that it managed to become the new powerhouse of Egypt instead of the classical upper class. The new rising middle class was fuelled by foreign investment and multinationals flowing in after Mubarak's much maligned economic reforms. And things were compounded by an information access explosion of epic proportions as the Internet became more accessible. Suddenly the upper middle class was exposed to how people elsewhere lived, not through movies, but through actual interaction or even direct observation as the newfound wealth allowed them to travel abroad on vacations. And suddenly there was a growing trend of people deciding that what society has always dictated might not be necessarily right.

Suddenly people were talking about why it's not OK for girls to ride motorcycles. People were for the first time seriously backlashing against the social push to cover up women. Nostalgia about the more socially liberal (but still conformist and uniform in its liberalism) sixties grew. And people started pursuing crazy business ideas beyond the confines of the old dictates of becoming an engineer or a doctor.

And it was trickling down. Not just the wealth, or not mainly the wealth, but the ideas. The desire for freedom was trickling down to the middle and lower middle classes. It was a slow process, but it was a sure process.

And then the revolution happened. It was lead by the upper middle class (and the Islamists if we are to get real) who had decided that the Mubarak regime was the main/only obstacle to achieving their dream of a more free society. But the reality is Mubarak was never a hurdle or a real accelerant of the process. His reforms may have helped in the liberalisation of part of society, but that wasn't the direct intent. Nor was there a direct intent to do the opposite. Mubarak was a technocrat. A decrepit and old technocrat perhaps, but still a technocrat not an ideologue.

As the revolution continued the upper middle class discovered that the hordes who had joined them had not joined for the same reasons. Freedom was not part of their agenda. In fact, a large component, the MB had joined to achieve the exact opposite of more freedoms. The MB had joined to achieve even more uniformity in society, a uniformity based on the MB's fascist idea of what the ideal citizen should look like. But the bulk of the body of the revolution was people who joined because they were promised they would get richer if Mubarak was removed.

The middle and working classes had yet received the same exposure the upper middle class had. They had not achieved any conviction that Egypt needs more "freedoms." They needed more time, more education, more interaction, and more enlightenment to reach that point. That's why when time came to make choices, they made choices that were not based on achieving more freedoms, but instead followed promises of wealth and/or stability.

And can you blame them? After all, the leadership of the revolution, the activists, turned into some of freedoms' worst enemies. They issued black lists, called for political disenfranchisement of thousands of people, ostracised millions of people for electoral choices, and even made decisions about which art was acceptable and revolutionary and which art was vulgar and reactionary. In the aftermath of the nihilistic landscape created by the "activists" after the revolution, why would anyone not look for a solution that would at least guarantee a minimum level of stability needed for normal humans to function properly.

So in a way, perhaps January was a setback in the inevitable path of society liberalising. Perhaps we were on a path where increasing numbers of people were getting convinced that breaking social norms is not necessarily bad. And at one point, a true critical mass would be created where society would change itself by itself. After which, a change in the governing system or regime would only be a technicality. Instead, the revolution theorised that trouble was entirely with the regime or that the regime somehow was blocking social growth (which is demonstrably false, the regime was oblivious to it). The focus on deconstructing the regime thus created a situation where chaos and vulnerability have become very solid concerns not just conspiracy theories. The backlash is inevitable, but it will cost us years of social development.

فرقتوا ايه عن الاخوان؟

موضة جديدة على تويتر تتلخص في ان الواحد يجيب حاجتين واحدة ليها علاقة بأيام مرسي وواحدة ليها علاقة باليومين دول ويقول فرقتوا ايه عن الاخوان.

الاجابة: فرقنا في الأساس اننا مش اخوان.

الحاجة المثيرة للاهتمام هي ان النوعية دي من المقارنات بيقولها من يسموا بالفلول المتطرفين بنفس ضراوة الثورجية فيم يتعلق بدستور لجنة الخمسين. المشكلة ان بالأخص في موضوع الدستور الاتنين عارفين ان فيه فرق وفيه فرق كبير. لكن اما للصيد في المياه العكرة في حال النشطاء أو تخيل حنكة سياسية وهمية تسمحلهم بتعديل الدستور لاحقا في حال الفلول الاتنين بيعملوا قياسات خاطئة مع دستور الاخوان.

الفرق الأول: هو الفرق مابين دستور الموناليزا اللي تبصله من أي حتة ينور وأحسن دستور أنزل في البشرية، ودستور اللي عملوه بيوصفوه انه من أفضل دساتير مصر. اه ممكن تروح تجيب حالة شاذة بتصف دستور لجنة ال٥٠ بأوصاف مبالغ فيها، انما متن وصف دستور الاخوان كان عبارة عن كتلة من الأفورة في حين ان عمرو موسى نفسه بيصف دستور ال٥٠ بأوصاف منضبطة.

الفرق التاني: هو الفرق بين نعم اللي بتدخل الجنة ونعم اللي ملهاش دعوة بالجنة. تاني ممكن تروح تجيبلي شيخ زاوية قال على دستور ال٥٠ يدخل الجنة لكن وزير الأوقاف في حكومة سيسي كاتل نفسه قال التصويت لا يمت بصلة للجنة والنار. الكنيسة موقفها واضح من الموافقة على الدستور لكن تاني مستخدمتش الدين في ابراز رأيها. يا راجل دا حتى حزب النور اللي واخدها كعب داير للدعاية للدستور مقالش نعم واجب شرعي. هتقوللي اصل هم بيقولوا على اللي قال لا كافر وانتو بتقولوا على اللي بيقول لا مش وطني، هقولك هات مصدر واحد عليه الطل قال كده. كلهم بيقولوا انزل قول رأيك أو احنا شايفين ان نعم ضرورية لإيقاف الإخوان.

الفرق التالت: إيه اللي هيحصل لو قلنا لا. في حين ان الإخوان مكانوش ساعة الدستور معرضين لأي مطالب بإزاحتهم بل كل المطالب كانت تتلخص في ان لجنة مختلفة لتعديل الدستور تتعمل، المرة دي الوضع مختلف. اللي بيقولك ان لا هتبقى دفعة قوية للإخوان واحتمال تساعدهم على الرجوع مش بيبتزك عشان تقول نعم زي الإخوان لأن الخطر المرة دي حقيقي وواضح وجلي. لو انت مصر تقنع نفسك ان الاستفتاء على الدستور ومش على الإخوان فآسف اني أصدمك ان الإخوان معاهم موافقة من الشعب على دستورهم من أقل من سنة وأي كلام عن شرعية ثورية أو شرعية مهلبية في ظل التصويت بلا على دستور لجنة ال٥٠ هيبقى أي كلام.

الفرق الرابع: هو إيه أصلا في الدستور. بمعنى أنا مشكلتي الكبرى مع الإخوان مكانتش أساليبهم لكن كانت محتوى دستورهم. أكيد الأساليب كانت زفت وأكيد الأساليب دلوقتي مختلفة حتى لو انت مختلف معاها. لكن الأساس في الموضوع هو المقارنة بين لجنة الإخوان اللي كان محمد الصاوي فيها بيمثل الكنيسة وبين لجنة ال٥٠ اللي فيها من السلفي لليبرالي على حق ربنا. الفرق في الآخر اللجنتين طلعوا إيه، دستور شال مادة عشان يسمح باغتصاب القاصرات واللا دستور ساوى جميع الناس وضمن حرياتهم وحقوقهم.

الفرق الخامس: بين دستور القرضاوي قال لو قلتوا عليه نعم قطر هتديكوا ٢٠ مليار. ودستور اللي عايز ساعدنا ساعدنا من قبل ما يشوف هو شكله عامل إيه والقرضاوي قال عليه دستور كفر.

انا معنديش استعداد اسيب الشارع للإخوان يعملوا دعاية ل"لا" ونقعد كلنا على تويتر نهري عن ازاي الاستفتاءات في ايسلندا مفيهاش سياسة حشد. الاستفتاءات في مصر مفيهاش الا حشد بقى واللا انتو لسه عايزين تتصدموا صدمة الدور الأول للانخابات الرئاسية تاني؟ لا يا عم أنا عايز الكلام اللي بيأكل عيش، أنا عايز الناس اللي بتعلق يفط، أنا عايز الناس اللي بتلف تعمل مؤتمرات، أنا عايز الناس اللي بتنقل الناس للجان. أنا عايز النتيجة تطلع نعم لأني متأكد ان كل اللي بيتفزلكوا دلوقتي ويقولوا مين قال ان لا في صالح الإخوان هيرجعوا يلطموا ويقولوا آسفين مكناش متصورين كده لو النتيجة طلعت لا. وساعتها كالعادة مش هنعرف نصرف أسفهم منين.

The fetish of accountability

Egypt is a country that has always lacked accountability. No denying it. In the Mubarak era, as in the Sadat era, as in every era of Egypt's history there was no moderate or productive concept of accountability. There was either no accountability or the nuclear option. Activists of the January 25th "revolution" believe they are introducing a novel concept to Egyptian society, a concept of accountability comparable to that in Western countries. They believe, as usual, that any objection to their view of how accountability should work stems from fear, ignorance, corruption, and/or misinformation among their opponents. But as usual, what they are selling just happens to be a rehashed version of Egypt's extremist approach towards its officials.

One of the main thesis behind January 25 is that Egypt had no concept of accountability. Accountability in this context was translated as firing (or demanding a resignation from) any official in office when anything ranging from an accident to a disaster happens. Once the official resigns we then proceed to take him to court where we exact "vengeance" upon them. The word vengeance might sound shocking in English, but it is a central idea in the Arab spring, qasaas or blood vengeance is a pillar of all the Arab revolutions.

Perhaps nowhere is this clearer than with the ministry of interior. The revolution itself was based on a demand that Mubarak's minister of interior resign. As soon as the minister of interior was relieved, the revolution morphed into something else. Why and how it did is beyond the scope of this post. But what matters is that demands that he resign changed into demands that he be tried, or that he be executed as a means of attaining justice and vengeance for slain "protestors." When he was imprisoned and presented to trial, the chaos resulting from the revolution resulted into more rioting and street clashes in which more "protestors" were killed. Demands then moved on to executing the new minister of interior and holding him and SCAF accountable. This kept happening through perhaps half a dozen cabinet reshuffles in three years, with each new MoI almost immediately being labelled a butcher, his resignation almost immediately being demanded, and his execution as a means of achieving "justice" soon to follow.

The very same happened with transport ministers. In fact, it has been happening with transport ministers since Mubarak. Transport minister after transport minister has resigned as a result of demands they be held accountable after train accidents. Yet train accidents keep happening just as street clashes keep happening. So why is accountability not working? The theory is that once you force an official to resign and then drag them through the mud and take them to court, the following official would not make the same mistakes.

The reason is that Egyptian activists completely lack understanding of accountability. Accountability means that one is held accountable to perform within expected parameters given the resources they have been provided. And the resources any official is provided in Egypt are meagre. The minister of transport could completely eradicate train accidents, but he has two options to do so, raise fares so they are comparable to European trains, or completely stop train services. The leftist demand that essentially unpaid and accident-free train transport is provided in a country as poor as Egypt is simply not going to happen. We can change dozens of transport ministers a month, we can execute hordes of officials a week, trains would still crash. It is a simple matter of economics and physics.

In a brilliant tweet, a well known anarchist commented on the death of a man under a subway train by stating that thousands of people die under subways or of Hepatitis C without us taking their rights from those who killed them. The guy turned out to have committed suicide by jumping off a pedestrian bridge. Who killed him? Who should we "take their rights" from? Who exactly are we supposed to demand resign then demand they be "tried fairly then executed?" Who is accountable for the Hep C endemic in Egypt? An endemic blamed squarely by the Egyptian left on Mubarak, but in fact one almost entirely caused by Nasser's contaminated Bilharzia shots. What is a priority, spending time, money, and effort on looking for someone to blame for Hep C; or spending the same informing people about methods to stop the spread of the infection?

And speaking of accountability, why so sensitive about holding activists and major political figures of the revolution accountable? Why should we consider policy differences with Mubarak crimes but not consider recorded evidence of fomenting chaos, vying to compromise national security, and misleading millions of youth potential crimes?