Monday, May 7, 2012

Paradigm shift

The revolutionary paradigm since the beginning of the Egyptian revolution has been a contrast between revolutionary and reactionary. The definition of the borderline between the two camps was initially clear. If you supported the January 25th revolution (Jan25) you belonged to the revolutionary camp, if you opposed it in any way you were reactionary. As with everything in the Egyptian revolution the definition was based almost entirely on superficial and naive readings (if not Youtube clip watchings) of classical revolutions.

As days progressed the lines became blurred. Where do we place those that are ambivalent or ambiguous on Jan25? How do we define people who tacitly supported the revolution but essentially oppose its aims? How do we react when it seems that it is in our favor to label others as reactionary? Do we practice the suicidal practice of early Latin American revolutions and start targeting each other, or do we follow the suit of South Africa and Eastern Europe and focus on moving forward? We did something totally new, we kept redefining the two camps to include all possible permutations existing simultaneously and without any sense or logic. The revolutionary camp included everything from: The MB only, the MB and Salafists only, Salafists and liberals only, anarchists and liberals only, Salafists and anarchists only, Baradei campaign and anarchists only, socialists and liberals only. You name it, we would provide it readily through a talk show, a street riot, a peaceful protest, a sit-in, a Molotov cocktail party, or any combination thereof (how about an anarchist-socialist-Salafist peaceful Molotov cocktail party sit-in?)

So here we are at the presidential elections, the paradigm according to those who "support the revolution" is again that we are facing a dichotomy between two groups of presidential candidates. Revolutionary candidates: Abulfotooh (unless you are an MB member), Hamdein Sabahy, Khaled Ali, and Morsi (only if you are an MB member). The reactionary camp is Amr Mousa and Ahmed Shafiq. I think that this theory has been proven wrong in the parliamentary elections. Revolutionary youth made an incredible effort to convince us that the main threat and the main danger is a sweeping win by reactionaries (at that time defined as anyone who at any point had come in contact in any way with the NDP). They spent all their time and effort to battle this proclaimed tsunami of Mubarakists promising to dominate the parliament. The end result was "bartaman el-thawra" and its astounding performance.

Thus I am proposing that the true dichotomy is between Islamists and non-Islamists. This dichotomy existed in the referendum, and it reiterated itself very strongly in the parliamentary elections. Liberal and socialist youth and intelligentsia denied the existence of this division in both cases based on the fact that Mubarak said it existed thus it must be false. But deny it or not, the Islamists are certainly not denying it, and if you are going to give them everything without a fight, they will gladly accept it. The true division in the election is between Islamists: Morsi, Awwa, Abulfotooh  and non-Islamists: Mousa, Shafiq, Sabahy, and Khaled Ali. Personally, whoever surpasses the others in the second camp in opinion polls gets my vote. I have no problem for anyone from the Islamist spectrum supporting Abulfotooh, but the religious zeal with which some liberals and socialists embrace him shows an underlying suicidal romanticism that scares me more than all the bloodshed this country has seen since Jan25. At the end of the day Abulfotooh is going to line up with Abdelmenein Elshahhat as they have consistently done since the revolution. 

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