So the first ever presidential debate in the history of the Arab world took was not actually the first ever debate in the history of the Arab world. A lot of "activists" and "intellectuals" have been quick to point out that Mauritania had televised debates before its presidential elections in 2007. Elections that brought democracy, multi-party politics, and ... a military coup to what is now the economic superpower of ... Mauritania? Anyway, close but no cigar activists and intellectuals, the first ever televised presidential debates in the Arab world were hosted by Amr Adeeb before the Egyptian elections of 2006. True it was pretty much an exercise in futility since Mubarak refused to participate, but still.
Anyway, beyond the stunning Twitterish revelations about how nothing is as it seems to be, Thursday was the first significant presidential debate in Egypt. The debate was between Amr Moussa and Abulfotooh. Why these two? For some reason ONTV and Dream concluded these two were most likely to score highest in the first round based on (never tried) polls. Supporters of both candidates insist theirs won the debate, but what does winning the debate really mean? What did Moussa and Abulfotooh walk into this expecting and intending to achieve?
In stable democracies, a candidate normally relies on a stable support base and goes into campaigning to gain enough of the swing vote to score a win. Are there really camps in Egypt, and is there a swing vote that can be won through words? Or is it simply waiting for someone to buy the vote or blackmail/terrorize it one way or another. Amr Moussa supposedly has a support base among the elderly, lower middle class, and significant portions of the rural vote. He has zero chance of winning the Islamist vote and the liberal/socialist revolutionaries. He is essentially seen as a vestige of the old regime and thus an insult to the revolution. So going into the debate Moussa just attacked mercilessly; stressing Abulfotooh's ties to the MB; his history with paramilitary Islamists; and his dubiousness on women's rights, minorities, and personal rights in general. The thesis is he was never going to win the Islamist vote, so why not alienate it a bit more, while at the same time solidifying his support base and fracturing his opponents. And in all honesty he might have achieved that, but what he missed is that most of Egypt's vote is still undecided and they were waiting to see him presenting anything resembling a platform so they could jump on his bandwagon. But other than the sharp and deadly attacks, Moussa's answers were meandering triangulating exercises in the unspecific.Thus he actually lost a lot people who might have voted for him based solely on name recognition. True, most of these people would not be voting for Abulfotooh instead, but he isn't getting their vote either!!
Abulfotooh went into the debate thinking he was in a much more secure position. He is seen as a "revolutionary" candidate. He was imprisoned by the Mubarak regime, which according to the metrics of the Egyptian revolution adds plenty to his credibility. On the other hand Moussa's main strength, his prior experience, can easily be used to bite him in the heiny by linking policy failures of the regime in general to Moussa in particular. However, again he was thinking of how he can hurt his opponent, not about his own position and potential.
Abulfotooh has the most fragile base of any of the serious candidates. His support base is admittedly diverse, combining socialists, liberals, non-ideological upper middle class, moderate cultural-Islamists, MB deserters, and even the formal endorsement of many extremist Islamists. How he managed to gather such a disparate base is a testament to his skill, but Moussa clearly demonstrated its fragility. Abulfotooh's main aim of the day was to paint Moussa as a regime remnant, but Moussa deftly and viciously turned every argument into a discussion of Abulfotooh's positions on church-state relations. Abulfotooh blundered badly on several occasions. He was painted as a partisan who only cares for his ideology not for the country, as a religious demagogue who can't focus on worldly events (this was so out of character it shocked me), and as a theocrat who wanted to rule with divine right. When Moussa cornered him on apostasy, the response amazingly managed to alienate both the Salafists and liberals in his support base.
Common wisdom normally sucks, but the common wisdom about this debate may be right: This debate was won by the candidates who did not participate. Moussa seemed to be intent on driving most potential supporters into the Shafiq or Sabahy camps, he only has inertia and the fear of an all-Islamist final round to carry him. Abulfotooh was determined to quickly dismantle his support base and disperse it between Morsi and Sabahy. So at the end of the day I am gonna say watch the upcoming polls very closely because the order of candidates is very likely to see a strong reshuffle. If Sabahy by some miracle manages to exceed Abulfotooh then who knows, we may have a Nasserite in the final round after all.
Anyway, beyond the stunning Twitterish revelations about how nothing is as it seems to be, Thursday was the first significant presidential debate in Egypt. The debate was between Amr Moussa and Abulfotooh. Why these two? For some reason ONTV and Dream concluded these two were most likely to score highest in the first round based on (never tried) polls. Supporters of both candidates insist theirs won the debate, but what does winning the debate really mean? What did Moussa and Abulfotooh walk into this expecting and intending to achieve?
In stable democracies, a candidate normally relies on a stable support base and goes into campaigning to gain enough of the swing vote to score a win. Are there really camps in Egypt, and is there a swing vote that can be won through words? Or is it simply waiting for someone to buy the vote or blackmail/terrorize it one way or another. Amr Moussa supposedly has a support base among the elderly, lower middle class, and significant portions of the rural vote. He has zero chance of winning the Islamist vote and the liberal/socialist revolutionaries. He is essentially seen as a vestige of the old regime and thus an insult to the revolution. So going into the debate Moussa just attacked mercilessly; stressing Abulfotooh's ties to the MB; his history with paramilitary Islamists; and his dubiousness on women's rights, minorities, and personal rights in general. The thesis is he was never going to win the Islamist vote, so why not alienate it a bit more, while at the same time solidifying his support base and fracturing his opponents. And in all honesty he might have achieved that, but what he missed is that most of Egypt's vote is still undecided and they were waiting to see him presenting anything resembling a platform so they could jump on his bandwagon. But other than the sharp and deadly attacks, Moussa's answers were meandering triangulating exercises in the unspecific.Thus he actually lost a lot people who might have voted for him based solely on name recognition. True, most of these people would not be voting for Abulfotooh instead, but he isn't getting their vote either!!
Abulfotooh went into the debate thinking he was in a much more secure position. He is seen as a "revolutionary" candidate. He was imprisoned by the Mubarak regime, which according to the metrics of the Egyptian revolution adds plenty to his credibility. On the other hand Moussa's main strength, his prior experience, can easily be used to bite him in the heiny by linking policy failures of the regime in general to Moussa in particular. However, again he was thinking of how he can hurt his opponent, not about his own position and potential.
Abulfotooh has the most fragile base of any of the serious candidates. His support base is admittedly diverse, combining socialists, liberals, non-ideological upper middle class, moderate cultural-Islamists, MB deserters, and even the formal endorsement of many extremist Islamists. How he managed to gather such a disparate base is a testament to his skill, but Moussa clearly demonstrated its fragility. Abulfotooh's main aim of the day was to paint Moussa as a regime remnant, but Moussa deftly and viciously turned every argument into a discussion of Abulfotooh's positions on church-state relations. Abulfotooh blundered badly on several occasions. He was painted as a partisan who only cares for his ideology not for the country, as a religious demagogue who can't focus on worldly events (this was so out of character it shocked me), and as a theocrat who wanted to rule with divine right. When Moussa cornered him on apostasy, the response amazingly managed to alienate both the Salafists and liberals in his support base.
Common wisdom normally sucks, but the common wisdom about this debate may be right: This debate was won by the candidates who did not participate. Moussa seemed to be intent on driving most potential supporters into the Shafiq or Sabahy camps, he only has inertia and the fear of an all-Islamist final round to carry him. Abulfotooh was determined to quickly dismantle his support base and disperse it between Morsi and Sabahy. So at the end of the day I am gonna say watch the upcoming polls very closely because the order of candidates is very likely to see a strong reshuffle. If Sabahy by some miracle manages to exceed Abulfotooh then who knows, we may have a Nasserite in the final round after all.
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