The presidential elections are a second step in establishing the legitimacy of the new order in Egypt, after the constitutional referendum earlier in the year. My conclusions on the constitutional referendum were that a solid block was coalescing behind the legitimacy of the new order. The results of the elections as compared to the referendum are an important indicator of where things have gone within the last roughly five months. The comparison must also be with huge caveats having to do with the different natures of a referendum and an election.
First, facts about the pre-process. Sabahy and Sisi are the only two candidates. Sabahy is a tragic figure whose assured failure in 2012 and 2014 proved a self-fulfilling prophecy. Sabahy also claimed support from and representation of revolutionary forces. His campaign followed routes and messaging traditionally taken by the youth who have been protesting since 2011: Urban, confrontational, revolutionary, blunt. Sisi has basically had no campaign. There is some evidence of state support for a Sisi win, but it's mostly anecdotal, and the state has taken conscious steps to make a show of seeming impartial. The Sisi campaign lacks the mobilisation and voter turning-out techniques of either the MB or of the traditionalists Shafik used in 2012. The Sisi campaign was an inefficient, mostly absent social media PR machine.
Second, facts about the process. The process was more open than any previously seen in Egypt. International observation and access was unprecedented. Transparency of the process was high. Security was tight and professional. The high commission was a horrible manager. The government did not help either. Rash decisions like vacation days and extra voting days were unseemly, ineffective, and panicky. Public media was professional and level. Private media was hysterical and unprofessional. The results represent the votes cast, and voter influencing was more limited than any other elections in Egyptian history, not due to a conscious decision, but due to the utter ineptitude of both campaigns.
Third, facts about the results. Turnout was around 25.5 million at around 47%. Very good turnout for Egyptian elections and falling just shy of the highly contested and extremely mobilised elections in 2012. Sisi won with about 23.5 million votes, higher votes than given for anything at the polls in Egypt; be it candidate, party, or referendum question.
The open questions are: How large is the influence of the MB, and did it diminish since the referendum? How much influence do revolutionary youth have. What is the definition of Sisi's power base, is it solid, and is it the same as the base that passed the constitution? Is it the same as the base that voted in Shafik?
First, facts about the pre-process. Sabahy and Sisi are the only two candidates. Sabahy is a tragic figure whose assured failure in 2012 and 2014 proved a self-fulfilling prophecy. Sabahy also claimed support from and representation of revolutionary forces. His campaign followed routes and messaging traditionally taken by the youth who have been protesting since 2011: Urban, confrontational, revolutionary, blunt. Sisi has basically had no campaign. There is some evidence of state support for a Sisi win, but it's mostly anecdotal, and the state has taken conscious steps to make a show of seeming impartial. The Sisi campaign lacks the mobilisation and voter turning-out techniques of either the MB or of the traditionalists Shafik used in 2012. The Sisi campaign was an inefficient, mostly absent social media PR machine.
Second, facts about the process. The process was more open than any previously seen in Egypt. International observation and access was unprecedented. Transparency of the process was high. Security was tight and professional. The high commission was a horrible manager. The government did not help either. Rash decisions like vacation days and extra voting days were unseemly, ineffective, and panicky. Public media was professional and level. Private media was hysterical and unprofessional. The results represent the votes cast, and voter influencing was more limited than any other elections in Egyptian history, not due to a conscious decision, but due to the utter ineptitude of both campaigns.
Third, facts about the results. Turnout was around 25.5 million at around 47%. Very good turnout for Egyptian elections and falling just shy of the highly contested and extremely mobilised elections in 2012. Sisi won with about 23.5 million votes, higher votes than given for anything at the polls in Egypt; be it candidate, party, or referendum question.
The open questions are: How large is the influence of the MB, and did it diminish since the referendum? How much influence do revolutionary youth have. What is the definition of Sisi's power base, is it solid, and is it the same as the base that passed the constitution? Is it the same as the base that voted in Shafik?
Overall, 5.3 million extra voters showed up at the polls compared to the referendum. Private media made a huge deal of out-of-province voters not being able to vote as opposed to the referendum. Putting the number of out-of-provincers at 8 million but ignoring that only 450,000 voted in the referendum. With the additional difficulty in verification that allowing out of province votes introduces, the extra votes were certainly not worth it. The only two provinces where extra voters did not show up were South Sinai and Red Sea, both due to banning out of province voters, and both in very small numbers.
Another important trend in voter turnout can be seen if the weight is normalised to total voters. This diminishes the dominating effect of Cairo's huge voter base. In total there were 26% extra voters since the referendum. All provinces shared in the increase (except South Sinai). However, there are three major notes. First is expats. The percentage increase is actually over 300%, this huge jump is a very important indicator, but I will consider it more later. The second is North Sinai. The heroic turnout in the referendum was more than doubled in the elections. This is very critical, because one of the main arguments used against Sisi is the allegation that his "war on terrorism" has been a failure. Votes in North Sinai, where terrorism is at its most real, increasing is an indicator that a lot of people are not buying neither the argument, nor the quotation marks. The third note is that generally Upper Egypt provinces contributed more percentage increase in voter turnout than the Delta. This might be because the Delta was already saturating, indicating the approaching ceiling of Egyptian participation and the no-man's land that lies beyond 60% participation. But it can also be an indicator of diminishing Islamist influence in the South.
Comparing Yes votes in the referendum to Sisi votes in the election, shows that it tracks very well with the increase in turnout in every province. This has to be taken with a grain of salt. Is this increase of 4.3 million votes an indication that the block that Sisi managed to materialise at the polls in the referendum has increased? I would say that only the balance of Upper Egyptian votes over Delta vote increase percentage that is truly added. Other than North Sinai, expats, and Upper Egypt, the common increase between all provinces is a result of increased enthusiasm for an election versus a referendum as well as ad-hoc and frenzied mobilisation efforts by El-Nour and traditional forces in the Delta. I believe that there is a tremendous overlap between those who voted yes for the constitution and those who voted for Sisi. Sisi managed to fend off apathy driven by his inevitable win, but he didn't manage to increase or solidify this base. This base, however, is the largest ever electoral base in the history of the country. It is also heterogeneous and has divergent expectations and requirements. Keeping this base solid and how it responds to the parliamentary elections and attempts by Islamists to pull it towards apathy and/or street protests will be something to watch out for.
Comparing Sisi's performance to the 2012 elections would be incomplete without considering differences between the two elections. It is very probable that there was more state intervention in favour of Sisi in 2014 than for either candidates in 2012. However, apathy was absolutely not something that either candidate had to fight against in 2012. In fact, the extreme polarisation all but ensured high turnout. Additionally 2012 saw a concerted and respectable on-the-ground voter mobilisation and election day activities by both the MB and the traditional forces. Mobilisation by Sabahy was non-existent and by Sisi was a sporadic last minute decision.
Sisi had significantly more votes than either candidate. When comparing him to Shafik, Sisi had more votes in all provinces, in many provinces more than double Shafik votes. Particularly notable is high Islamist influence provinces like Fayoum and Matrouh, which I identified as particular problems for Sisi in the referendum. These provinces are still a problem, but Sisi is obviously having an easier time gaining support there than Shafik (in the absence of an Islamist candidate). Particularly noteworthy is the expat vote, where almost four times as many people voted for Sisi than Shafik. This is due to the "revolutionary" message that managed to significantly mudsling Shafik losing credibility. But it is also due to new countries entering the expat voting community in force, particularly the UAE and Eastern North America. However, overall, Sisi's gains on Shafik were higher where Shafik did worse in 2012.
Sisi had more votes than Morsi in all provinces except Fayoum and Matrouh. Matrouh is a very low voter base province that I already predicted in the referendum was voluntarily taking itself out of the political game. Fayoum is an Islamist hotbed and will remain a significant problem for Sisi. Otherwise, Sisi only did slightly better in Minya, Beni-Suef, and Asyut where the MB is strong. And he did incredibly better in the Delta, Cairo, and tourist dependent provinces, which is not at all unexpected. I would only point out Qena and North Sinai as worth noting. Qena is transitional between Middle Egypt where the MB is strong and Upper Egypt where they are not but where mobilisation is low. It also doesn't have as big of a Christian vote as Middle Egypt. The 100% increase in votes over Morsi there is worth noting.
Sisi had more votes than Shafik and Morsi combined in eight provinces, three of which only slightly more. Overall he fell 1.7 million votes short of equaling them both combined. In four Delta provinces, he had significantly more votes than both combined.
To conclude, Sisi has the mandate he wanted. Whichever way you want to slice it, he won. Irregularities and unclear air during the process were matched or exceeded by much worse conditions in 2012. The votes are less mobilised and more spontaneous. Turnout is very good for Egyptian elections. He fought apathy well. His total votes are the highest in Egyptian history and are in the ballpark of Morsi and Shafik combined. He has no stigma associated with being "felool" or the word itself has lost its potency. There is no successful boycott campaign in Egypt, even the Shura council was not a boycott, but rather indifference. The MB have had their popularity slightly decreased. Sisi has kept his popularity about the same. Any attempt to try to challenge the results through street protests will be counterproductive. Any attempt to use them to leverage him to give concessions will not work.
However, it's with the 23 million that Sisi will have to contend. What do they want? How can he deliver it? Can he keep them intact? Will they hold together to the parliamentary elections? My sentiment is that this is the last station where this new political block will give Sisi a pass. Now they want to see what he has to offer, and they won't support unconditionally anymore. The MB and revolutionary youth are counting on Sisi disappointing this base, pushing them back to the couch and paving the way for another revolution by an "active mass" (codeword for minority enforced change). However, the availability of felool as an alternative and the looming parliamentary elections is the main point they are missing. As always in Egypt, it's a game of providing alternatives. And many forces that have so far supported Sisi by making him the only alternative will cease to do so.
