The MB is not A terrorist organisation

No it is not.

The MB is not a terrorist organisation. The MB is the terrorist organisation.

You know how in some action video games you are fighting a horde of insectoid aliens and then you reach a final level in which you meet a queen insect who is the mother of all aliens. The MB is the queen mother. The MB is the Borg queen. it is the root of all evil, and the mother of all catastrophes that have infested the Islamic world since it first bubbled to the surface.

By the turn of the twentieth century, there was a rising tide of fundamentalism in the Islamic world. But it was a fundamentalism in the essential sense of the word, a return to the fundamentals, a focus on the barebones of the faith and an abandonment of all the flakes that had attached themselves to Islam over centuries. It was an enlightenment movement that came as a response to the suppressed but not entirely killed sterility of Wahabist fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia. The movement was the Protestantism of Islam, a refocus on personal relation to scripture, an abandonment of acquired liturgy, and disenfranchisement of clergymen. And it could have helped the Islamic world join the rest of the world in the social revolutions of the twentieth century.

But it was aborted.

Or perhaps it was co-opted. A guy born in a village in the Eastern Delta called Hassan El-Banna had a vision. The vision was recreating the world in the image of his village. Why? Because that's all he knew. Method: Claim that Islam is under threat of extinction and that you are its saviour. And the Muslim Brotherhood was born. A strange mix of theatre troupe, KKK-like secrecy, clandestine literature, military-like structure, and a good dose of heresy relative to Islamic orthodoxy.

But it was when the Banna-ist ideology mated with the diseased psychosis of Sayyed Qutb that the true MB materialised. Sayyed Qutb was driven almost entirely by sexual frustration born of a very unsuccessful trip to the US where his romantic advances were apparently rebuffed by a random blonde. When he came back to Egypt he formulated the first explicit ideology in the Islamic world that fostered: A deep seated hate of the West, non-Muslims, and social and personal liberties; The intent to raise generations and vanguards of ideologized undercover youth; the use of terrorism and violence to enforce the vision of the MB but only when the time is right and when the vanguard is ready.

The Qutbist/Bannaist cult is very similar in its ideology and action plan to White Supremacist organisations in the US. But the main problem is that the MB metastasised. Muslims have a problem they have to face, and by Muslims I mean the general population of peaceful Muslims in the world. It is true that the majority of Muslims are not terrorists. But it is also true that the majority of terrorists are Muslims. This wasn't the case in the past. Terrorism being a uniquely and distinctively Muslim trait can be traced in its origin to the MB. They were the ones who first introduced bombings of civilian targets to achieve political aims, and it happened within the lifetime of El-Banna and under his tutelage. Qutb later refined this into an art. As the MB grew it began to form offshoots and spinoffs. Some of them global, some local, and some global brands that later develop local franchises. Perhaps most critical of all was the offshoot of the Jamaa Islamiya in the seventies, which in turn spanned off a little organisation called Al-Qaeda.

Which is very convenient really. The MB can quit its earlier forays into direct terrorism and just outsource the dirty work to its offshoots. This was all well and good as long as the MB wasn't in power, and it allowed them to have perfect deniability. But as soon as they reached power the mask fell off. The terrorist offshoots were suddenly standing on the stage with the MB president, explicitly threatening physical violence against political opponents and fanning sectarian hate. Gullible liberal youth who believed the MB were on the path to reform were aghast. Veteran liberals with bloodied knuckles from the battles of the seventies and the nineties chuckled knowingly.

Perhaps among the gullible youth was president Obama. The theory that the MB are moderate and could absorb the terrorist inclinations of Islamist groups and channel them into taking power in the Middle East instead of attacking the West. Instead, the MB used said Islamists in the most flagrant and abhorrent manner, channeling their terrorism in ways that the US could not have foreseen.

In any case, the MB is a monster that Egypt gave birth to. And Egypt has decided to kill its monstrous child or die trying. Even if Obama does not approve.

The cause of the "revolution"

The Egyptian revolution of 2011, whether or not you like it, introduced radical change to Egypt. Change for the worse, a lot of people would argue. Those who were against the "revolution" from the get go claim that the change was for the worse because the revolution was malicious and ill-intentioned to begin with. Those who were for it, argue that the revolution was "betrayed" by various actors at various stages. I believe the revolution was a still birth. It killed itself. And the reason is, it was all built on a myth. The cause of the revolution was less solid than dragons.

The revolution was actually multiple revolutions. The Islamists joined it to start an Islamic state, the "revolutionary youth" started it either to start a democratic state or to get paid for footage or both, the military piled on to prevent the handover of power to Gamal Mubarak. Nobody betrayed the revolution, everyone worked to make their version of it work. None of the players managed to get anywhere.

The main causes given for the revolution of 2011 happening are actually the motives of the three main actors joining in. Other causes given are in fact catalysts. Preventing a Gamal Mubarak presidency, vying for an Islamic state, or looking for a Bush-esque democratisation of Egypt a la liberation of Iraq were all motives, but not causes. The revolution in Tunisia, the proliferation of cultural dissatisfaction among the rising upper middle class, and police brutality (alleged or real) were all catalysts that helped galvanise street movement.

Alone, the motives and catalysts were enough to cause the initial waves of protest and rioting on January 25th. However, what turned a sit-in into a revolution is a full blown civil disobedience and general strike that had its roots in a myth perpetuated by everyone.

"Egypt is a rich country"

The statement is a staple of every social studies book in Egyptian schools. Although the treatment of Egypt's geography in school books is professional an realistic. The axiomatic assertion that Egypt is rich is always maintained. But if Egypt is rich, why are Egyptians poor? The axiom and the question were internalised into almost every Egyptian of all walks of life. The answer to the question ranged between "Egypt is rich but its resources are mismanaged" to "Egypt is rich but Mubarak's elite steal all the money", the latter ironically pronounced more often by people who are themselves elite.

The axiom-question pair is what pushed hundreds of thousands of people to join protests and sit-ins between February 4th and 11th 2011. Perhaps they were manipulated by the "activists", perhaps they were being herded by the MB. But one fact remains, they knew fully well why they were going out to protest: They wanted the riches of Egypt to reflect upon them.

That's why the revolution has faltered. Because the real revolution was not based on the promise of a democratic state or an Islamic state, it was based on the promise of a rich state. And since Egypt being rich is a myth, the revolution has gone and will continue to go through spasms in which declining portions of the population join one side or another to remove one side or another because Egyptians aren't rich yet, and Egypt is rich, which means that the revolution is being betrayed.

Perhaps the spasms will die soon, or perhaps it will take some time. It all depends on how soon Egyptians realise a critical fact: Egypt is a resource-poor overpopulated country that was on its way to maximising its growth potential before 2011. Now we would be lucky to go back to the development path of January 24th 2011. Admitting this fact is bitter, it's also scary because the amount of intellectual terror that would be unleashed on someone as being regime ancien for saying this is significant. But facts must be faced if this country is to be saved.

Perhaps a point by point discussion of the arguments made in favour of Egypt being rich is warranted. Invariably, the arguments include: Egypt has a lot of land, most of it unused; Egypt has lots of mineral resources; population is an asset, look at Japan and Korea; we have a lot of sunshine lets produce a shitload of solar energy; we have a lot of natural gas and oil.

"Egypt has a lot of land, all of it unused, and Mubarak is stopping the youth from settling the land because he works for Israel," I was informed of that by a very serious looking scientist in 2005. He was fully convinced of what he was saying. The argument of Egypt's unused land is easily answered by the fact that most of the unused land is unusable. Egypt is one of the driest countries in the world, our agricultural activities are water-limited not land-limited, and we are already global trend-setters for productivity and efficiency in irrigated agriculture. Our grazing lands in the Sinai and coastal regions are among some of the most efficiently and ecologically soundly used in the world. Why don't you use a more efficient irrigation technique than basin irrigation in the Delta you say? Because otherwise the water table will drop and salinity in the Delta will lead to an ecological disaster.

Egypt doesn't have tonnes of precious metals. Egypt has moderate resources of some minerals, and it is making the most out of them. There really isn't a huge gold mine along the Wittwatersrand in South Africa, we don't have diamond mines either. We have a single gold mine that is just starting to be economic in terms of extraction. Nor do we have substantial oil or gas reserves. We barely have enough to cover our energy needs. In fact anything we have is immediately drowned by the every increasing population.

Which brings us to the most misleading argument of all: Population is a resource, Japan made use of it. True, population can be a resource. But this is only true when water and land resources are able to support the population. Population growth on the other hand is never a resource. Japan and Korea are often used as examples, nobody mentions the fact that both have had a fraction of Egypt's population growth in the past four decades, and that both now have nearly no population growth, and that in both cases this was an intentional policy and a welcome result. In fact, China managed to achieve economic growth only after instituting draconian birth control policies. Even Iran provides government subsidised birth control and has its Shiia clergy encouraging smaller families. In fact, even oil-rich Gulf countries are instilling in their peoples a sense that smaller families are better. Only in Egypt is their a sentiment that population growth is good based on no empirical or theoretical evidence. If population growth were universally recognised as an asset and Mubarak only tried to stifle it because Israel told him to do so, why did international pop-culture produce Dan Brown's newest marvel of alarmism "Inferno"?

We are a poor country. We need stability. Stability is not stagnation. Stability is tourism and foreign investment. Investment is not a bad word, it means jobs. Investors are not evil, they are taking a chance on us. Stop listening to second rate Twitter pundits and face the reality of Egypt and its revolution. Perhaps then we can start a new revolution based on work-ethic, fighting corruption and waste, institutionalism, and eradication of sexism and xenophobia. Something that can have more impact on the lives of normal people instead of an impact on the bank accounts of April 6th activists.

الحكم المتداولة

الحكم المتداولة في مصر غالبا غلط. و الحكم المتداولة على الانترنت بشكل اخص غلط اكتر و اكتر. على الانترنت بنخلق مجموعة من العوالم الموازية فيها "حقائق" ملهاش اي اثبات او أمارة انها حقائق غير انها بتتكرر. بس هي بتتكرر بين ناس كلها ليها نفس الرأي تقريبا. الخروج من الانترنت بيكشف للواحد شوية حاجات يمكن تكون خافية عنه. لكن لأن حياتي الطبيعية كمان هي جزء من الحقيقة يمكن اكون انا نفسي في حياتي عايش في عالم موازي. معرفش. بس على الأقل اقدر اضمن ان فيه شوية حاجات بانت لي اوضح لما بعدت عن الانترنت المصري شوية.

١ العالم التويتري: الناس عاشقة السيسي / الناس شايفة السيسي قاتل

الحقيقة: محدش عاشق السيسي. محدش بيشتري شغل التسبيل بتاعه. ولو السيسي اترشح هيكسب من اول جولة. اينعم هيكسب من غير اعادة. عارفين ليه؟ لأن الناس مش هطل زي ما احنا فاكرينهم. الناس مش ماضيين لعبد الفتاح السيسي شيك على بياض ولا هيمضوله ومش بيحبوه لسحر عيونه ولا كاريزمته. الناس عايزة تنجز وتحسم لأنهم شايفين ان اسوأ حاجة هي حالة الولا حاجة المستمرة من ٣ سنين. و شايفين في السيسي اول امل يظهر ان ممكن ننجز عشان ناكل عيش. الموضوع ابسط بكتير من تنظيراتنا. وأبسط دي مش شتيمة، تنظير هي اللي شتيمة.

٢ العالم التويتري: اوعى احسن الناس بتتعاطف مع الاخوان

الحقيقة: محدش بيتعاطف مع الاخوان ولا حد عايز يشوفهم بيقوملهم قومة ومحدش لا تعاطف مع حرائر ولا خرائر ولا نيلة. اللي بيظهروا تعاطف مفاجئ مع الاخوان، اسأل اصحابهم هتلاقيهم كانوا بينزلوا رابعة بس مش كل يوم. منهم ناس يمكن نزلوا معانا ٣٠/٦ لكن قليل منهم قوي اللي منزلش مع الاخوان من ٤/٧ بعد عزل مرسي. فيه ناس بتقرف من الداخلية وفيه ناس خسرانة ان الامن يشد حيله وفيه ناس بتتظلم وفيه ناس سبوبتها هتروح. انما بالنسبة لغالب الشعب دا لا له علاقة بالاخوان ولا التعاطف.

٣ العالم التويتري: الاستفتاء على الدستور ملوش علاقة ب ٣٠/٦ ولا بالاخوان
الحقيقة: دي بالأخص ضربت في الأوساط الفلولية بشكل عجيب. طبعا ده استهبال. في الحقيقة وفي الشارع، الاقبال الضعيف وحتى التصويت ب لا هيعتبر نقطة ضخمة في صالح الاخوان وضد الشرعية الثورية ل ٣٠/٦. التصويت بنعم واجب. ايون التصويت بنعم واجب وكل الناس اللي بتروج للتصويت بنعم بيخدموا البلد دي ومستقبلها. ممكن نقعد نرغي كتير عن فلوس مين اللي اتصرفت على الاعلانات في الشارع ولون كلمة نعم أخضر ليه. بس من الاخر هو ده اللي هيأكل عيش. احنا ممكن نفضل عايشين بنمثل على بعض اننا المفروض في السويد بس هنفضل اسمنا بنمثل على بعض. اه وبالمناسبة النتيجة غالبا نعم وبنسبة كبيرة ودي مش حاجة وحشة.

Egyptian Twitter should die

The experiment is simple. Immerse yourself in Egyptian Twitter. Extract yourself from Egyptian Twitter. Observe. Invariably, the reaction is one of much reduced stress, much higher joy of life, and a better overall balance. Why is that? The reason has to do with the nature and peculiarities of Egyptian adult Twitter, as well as with universal information handling capacity.

First off, there is the question of content. Twitter everywhere is supposed to be a medium of flow of diverse information. A mix of politics, breaking news, and professional updates makes some part of any international citizen's Twitter timeline. But the bulk is mostly made up of trivia. In Egypt timelines are completely different. Trivia, pop culture, and geek updates make a small portion of a typical timeline. The bulk is made up of local news of protests, marches, and clashes, news of the day, endless opinions and rehashings of news of the day, endless analysis of news of the day, nitpicking of news of the day, misrepresentations of news of the day, exaggerations of news of the day, lies about news of the day, debunking the lies about news of the day, and by the end of the day discovering there really is little news of the day.

Secondly, there is the question of backgrounds. Backgrounds of major Twitter accounts with hundreds of thousands of followers that is. Again, in most Twitterspheres major accounts include movie stars, techno geek accounts, gaming site accounts, cooking channel accounts, weather update accounts, trivia, celebrities, and major political figures and pundits. In Egypt, the majority of immense-followership accounts basically have no credentials. From self-styled anarchist philosophers who have never read a serious book let alone written one, to self styled pundits with as much analytical power as a garden slug, to self-styled journalists who aim to address a limited circle of western journalists through "profound" neutral morally superior tweets. The major problem here is that everything is self-styled. Nothing has much to support it. Accounts of people with little integrity or potential have millions of followers and miraculously have the power to influence the opinions of thousands.

What all this combines into is a surreal parallel universe with a life of its own and a common wisdom that has nothing to dow with Egyptian reality. Egos of major accounts are stroked, growing to epic proportions. Meanwhile, their relevance to real life remains proportional to their true power. Which leads to frustration, and lashing out.

Meanwhile, personal accounts with few followers to a few thousand followers are caught up in a vicious cycle where they are simply assaulted by too much information. Leaving aside the fact that most "information" on Egyptian Twitter is hardly "information" at all, and that most of the collective effort is exhausted not in absorbing information but in debunking it, even real raw information is fed in a very wrong way. Nobody needs to know every fight that happens in every corner of the country. Nobody needs to know every street closure, or every burst pipe, or every residential block with a blackout. In fact, nobody should even want to know that kind of information. We are simply not designed to absorb that much information, it clouds our ability to see the real picture, to live our lives, to move forward. We get caught up on the mundane and we forget what really matters.

And then again perhaps even on Twitter there are parallel universes that exist side by side. After all, my timeline is a result of my decisions. Maybe I designed it to be this way. But I believe that for Twitter to have played such a radical role in the street action that has shaped and reshaped Egypt over the last few years perhaps most timelines look a lot like mine.

And perhaps that's why Egyptian Twitter has and will continue to be shocked by off-Twitter Egypt. Perhaps the continuity of the street actions and the inability to affect polls or real change is a result of the echo-chamber that we have forced our Twitter to be.

This is such a confusing mix of grimy on-the-ground in-every-corner minute-by-minute reporting, and complete detachment from reality. I really don't get it.

بالدستور هتكون شطور

بأي دستور في حقيقة الأمر. فقط نحتاج الى دستور.

لم يخطئ من قال أننا في وضع حرج قد لا يسمح لنا بكتابة دستور دائم وبالتالي نحتاج دستور مؤقت لفترة حتى تستقر الأمور ونصل الى قدر اكبر من التوافق. وإن كنت أرى في مشروع لجنة الخمسين نواة دستور قوي يتعدى فكرة المؤقت لكني لا أمانع التفكير به على هذا الأساس (التأقيت).

أنا أدعو للتصويت بنعم. لماذا؟ لأني أراه مشروع جيد للدستور. لأنه حقق قدر من التوافق لم أظنه ممكناً في هذه اللحظة. لأني أرى كل الإعتراضات الموضوعية مردود عليها. و أخيراً و بدون خجل لأني أرى الظرف يتطلب الموافقة عليه. نعم اعتقد اننا يجب ان نراعي الظرف في التصويت ولا أرى في هذا تشبها بالإخوان في تمريرهم لدستورهم نتيجة اختلاف محتوى الدستور ونتيجة اختلاف طبائع من يعارضه.

أولا أرى هذا الدستور جيد. أراه جيد بشكل مجرد كما أراه جيد بالمقارنة ليس فقط بدستور الإخوان ولكن أيضاً بدستور ١٩٧١ المعدل. الدستور الجيد هو الدستور الذي يحمي الأقلية من الأغلبية ويمكن الأغلبية من الحكم ويحمي الفرد من المجتمع والمواطن من الدولة بينما يمكن الدولة من بسط نفوذها. وهذه كلها مواصفات وجدتها في هذه المسودة. فمواد الحقوق الشخصية والمساواة الموجودة به لم أرى مثلها من قبل في مشاريع الدساتير المصرية والاعتراف بالحقوق الأساسية والتعددية يأتي لأول مرة مطلق ومتماشي مع المعايير العالمية. في حد ذاتها هذه مكاسب تاريخية أرى من الضرورة تمريرها عن طريق تدعيمها تصويتيا حتى تصبح حقاً مكتسبا.

وهنا نأتي لثانيا. فالمسودة تأتي ببعض المواد وبعض العبارات في الديباجة التي لا تعجبني. لكني لا أرى منها عبورا لأي خطوط حمراء. لذا أرى ما حدث هو تطبيق عملي لبناء التوافق عن طريق التنازلات المتبادلة. كمثال دستوري المثالي كان لينص على نظام رئاسي وانتخابات فردية ولم يكن لينص على شكل الضرائب. لكن دستور آخرين المثالي كان لينص على العكس تماماً. ولأني لا أدعي امتلاك الحق، فأنا أتفهم نظرهم لهذه الأمور. لذا أرى النص على تصاعدية الضرائب فقط على الأفراد حل وسط، وأرى إرجاء النظام الانتخابي للقانون، حيث يسهل تعديله، أمر واقعي. كما أرى نظام شبه مختلط يتنقل بين الرئاسي وشبه الرئاسي بناء على بنية البرلمان هو حل توفيقي. بنفس المنطق لا أستطيع إهمال وجود السلفيين في المجتمع كجزء فاعل فيه. ولا أستطيع أن أهمل تاريخية مباركتهم لدستور يحتوي على هذا القدر من المساواة والحقوق. لذا لا أستطيع أن أقول لا للدستور بناء على إصرارهم على مكسب رمزي في الديباجة.

إذا أعجبني كل شيء في الدستور فهو بالضرورة أغضب الكثيرين.

ثالثا لا يمكن إنكار وجود اعتراضات حقيقية عند البعض على الدستور لكني أراها مردود عليها. من جانب جزء من التيار الإسلامي الدستور مرفوض لمجرد كون دستور الإخوان مقبول وهو موقف لا يستحق الكثير من النقاش. بالنسبة لجزء من القوى التقليدية فالدستور مرفوض إما لتكوين اللجنة الذي أقصاهم أو لكون دستور ٧١ هو المقبول. لا يمكنني رفض منتج المسودة لمجرد تكوين اللجنة. إذا كانت هذه المسودة خرجت من لجنة الإخوان لقبلتها. كما أني أرى تكوين اللجنة جيد. فعلى الرغم من إقصائها للملايين التي انتخبت الفريق شفيق إلا أنها لجنة مجتمعية غير مسيسة حقاً. ضمت ممثلين عن فئات مجتمعية بشكل لم نره في لجان الإخوان. ففي لجنتي الإخوان تم تضخيم تمثيل الحزبيين لمجرد كون الإخوان حصلوا على أغلبية لحظية في البرلمان. كما تم اختيار الشخصيات المجتمعية بحيث تكون كلها شخصيات إسلامية. أما في لجنة الخمسين فكان الاختيار أعمى لدرجة اختيار أحد النقباء المنتمي للجماعة. أما عن دستور ٧١ فقد انتهى والتمسك به هو تمسك بالماضي لا محل له في الواقع. كل هذا لا يمنع وجود اعتراضات موضوعية لل"فلول" على بعض مواد الدستور.

الاعتراض الأساسي على ما يُرى أنه انتقاص من صلاحيات الرئيس وخلق رئيس "طرطور". أتفهم المخاوف هنا، لكني أراها ليست في محلها. حقيقة قام الدستور بتقليص صلاحيات الرئيس وأعطى المزيد من الصلاحيات التنفيذية للبرلمان. لكن يجب أن نلاحظ أن سلطة البرلمان لمنح وسحب الثقة هي حق أصيل ولا يمكن ترك يد الرئيس بدون وجود عامل موازن حتى في الأنظمة الرئاسية. أما عن صلاحيات البرلمان في المشاركة في تسمية الحكومة فهي تأتي فقط في حالة استطاعة البرلمان تكوين توافق مستقر وتأتي تحت تهديد حل البرلمان ككل. لذا فالمواد تسمح بنظام إما رئاسي أو مختلط بناء على قدرة المؤسسات. و أؤكد أن صلاحيات أقل للرئيس وأكثر لرئيس الوزراء في مصلحة الوطن. فتجربتنا السنتين الماضيتين تؤكد أن المجتمع غير مستقر ويتجه إلى تغيير السلطة التنفيذية بشكل مستمر. ونتيجة صعوبة تغيير الرئاسة بطرق دستورية يؤدي ذلك الى الموجات المتتالية من عمل الشارع وهو ما لا تستطيع الدولة تحمله كثيرا. تغيير السلطة التنفيذية عن طريق تغيير رئيس وزراء ذو سلطات حقيقية هو صمام أمان. كما أن الدساتير لا توضع لكي لا تتغير. نعم نعم أدرك أن "الاخوان قالوا كده" لكن أبواب نظام الحكم بالفعل هي أكثر الأبواب عرضة للتعديل في الدساتير لأنها تتغير لكي تتعلم من التجربة وتتغير لكي تلائم الواقع.

وأخيرا أرى التصويت بنعم لأن البلد محتاجاها. أدرك اعتراض الكثيرين على هذا، وأدرك أن التصويت على الدستور ولا يجب أن يكون تصويتا على ٣٠/٦ أو على إزاحة الإخوان. لكن الحياة ليست مثالية وليست عادلة. ربما أخبرنا بعضهم أنها عادلة لكنها ليست كذلك. الترويج بأن التصويت بلا لن يضر ٣٠/٦ ولن يفيد الإخوان هو ترويج سطحي أو مضلل. انتزع نفسك من كل المحيط بك وفكر. استفتي هذا الشعب منذ عام تقريبا على دستور الإخوان وقال نعم. لم يكن الحضور طاغيا ولم تكن ال نعم مدوية لكنها كانت نعم واضحة جلية تخترق حتى ادعاءات التزوير (الحقيقية). بعد سنة وبعد خلع نظام الإخوان يتم استفتاء نفس الشعب على دستور جديد ليحل محل دستور الإخوان فيقول الشعب لا. ما معنى هذه ال لا بالمقابلة بهذه ال نعم؟

يعتقد البعض بأن ال لا يجب أن تعني لجنة أخرى تعد وثيقة دستورية أخرى. وأنا أقول أن هذا السيناريو كارثي. في حالة التصويت ب لا يجب علينا الاستسلام لرجوع دستور الإخوان والتعامل مع تعديله لاحقا على الرغم من كونه أساس ضعيف. لماذا؟ لأن في حالة التصويت بلا من أدراني ما سبب ال لا؟ سيدعي الفلول ان ال لا جاءت نتيجة تقليص سلطات الرئيس لذا يجب تكوين لجنة جديدة يرضى عنها الفلول تقوم بتعديل جديد. سيدعي النشطاء أن ال لا نتيجة مادة المحاكمات العسكرية لذا يجب تكوين لجنة يرضون عنها تقوم بالتعديل. سيدعي الإخوان أن ال لا هي رفض لإلغاء دستورهم ورفض للحقوق والحريات والمساواة في وثيقة دستور ٢٠١٣. من سيكون الأحق؟ الإخوان. لماذا؟ لأن عندهم نتيجة استفتاء سابقة يستطيعون الإشارة إليها كدليل على أن الشعب رفض ٢٠١٣ لأنه وافق على ٢٠١٢. وفي الحقيقة يكون الحق في جانبهم. لا يمكنني أن أتخيل حال البلد في حال التصويت بلا ثم تكوين لجنة جديدة بمعايير لا ندريها لتجري تعديلات لا نعرف السبب فيها بينما يكسب الإخوان مكسبا معنويا هائلا يمكنهم من الحشد الداخلي وزيادة الضغوط الخارجية لدرجة لا تحتمل.

يمكنك التفكير في أني أبتزك لكي تقول نعم. لكن في الحقيقة أنا أحذر فقط من محاولة السير في طرق خطرة في حالة اللا. قل لا. لكن كن مدرك أن معناها عودة دستور الإخوان. وهذا في حد ذاته ليس كارثيا ولا استخدمه في الضغط عليك. فمن نزلوا في ٣٠/٦ نزلوا في الأساس لرفض محمد مرسي وحكم الإخوان ولم يكن يعنيهم دستور الإخوان. يمكننا التعايش مع دستور الإخوان لفترة حذرة حتى نستطيع تكوين توافق أكبر لكن لا يمكننا العيش في حالة انتقالية غير محددة المعالم والأسباب في وسط حالة من هياج الجماعات الدينية المتطرفة العنيفة.

Everyone goes Mandela

Since Mandela's death, talk of his experiment, particularly in post-Apartheid South Africa has bubbled to the surface of Egyptian debate. The main point being made is that Mandela's greatness stems from his ability to forgive and look forward. The thesis then is that everyone should forgive the MB and the MB should forgive everyone. And that this will ultimately be possible when a Mandela-like figure appears on the scene (most likely Baradei is implied here). I believe this is a rather simplistic view of both post-Apartheid South Africa and post 30/6 Egypt.

First of all the Mandela experience as laid out in the Egyptian intelligentsia is not exactly the historical Mandela or the historical South Africa. The narrative given is a hand wavy account of Mandela forgiving his persecutors while at the same time setting up a system for "transitional justice." This perfectly suits the revolutionary mythology built up in Egyptian media over the last three years, namely that there is an international norm and standard to achieve some form of extra judicial justice during transitional periods. Also, that there would be no stability or advancement unless such "transitional justice" is exacted.

In fact what Mandela did was to completely shred any concept of "justice" during the transition. This was done for pragmatic purposes. Mandela realised that justice means so many things to so many people. Justice to the countless Blacks living in townships meant revenge on the White society that for so long subjugated them. Justice for the warlike Inkatha in Natal simply meant independence after so many years of fighting the good fight. Justice to many Whites would be revenge on Mandela's own ANC for very real acts of terror it committed. Trying to extract justice would then be an open invitation to tearing the country apart. Moreover, trying to shake the boat would simply mean that the elite who oiled the machine of the state would suddenly abandon it, leading to a catastrophic breakdown that would worsen the lives of everybody. So Mandela opted instead to symbolic and largely voluntary truth and reconciliation tribunals where truth was shared by all sides, and everyone forgave everyone. A brilliant feat of very noble very immaterial very effective PR.

Let's review what happened in Egypt post January 25th 2011. Rapidly, a narrative was setup by the same people who now cling to the model of Mandela. The narrative was that there would be no moving forward until the regime ancien was held accountable for its crimes. The crimes started out as specific incidents of protestor deaths and rapidly mushroomed and ballooned into hazy accusations of political responsibility for ailments that are as old as the unification under Naarmer. The accused started out as a few leaders and mushroomed into a large network of very legitimate interests that covers millions of people in the Delta and Middle Egypt. The demanded method to achieve said goal started out as criminal courts, and when criminal courts failed to prosecute the nebulous accusations, demand was made for extraordinary tribunals. All along the MB pushed along the concept of the centrality of vengeance, using it as a pretext for purges. Purges that were naturally followed by replacement with MB cadres. The process was steadily approaching the army and was already tearing the judiciary apart.

Somewhere along the way, perhaps through a central intelligence but more likely through a distributed realisation, a recognition was made that this was a road to perdition.  And 30/6 happened.

Now all of a sudden the Mandela narrative is surfacing from the same people who talked about "transitional justice" for thirty six long months.

The Mandela model is irrelevant. First its window of opportunity has closed. The Mandela approach should have been taken immediately following the stepping down of Mubarak. Instead the focus turned immediately towards imprisoning him. Second, there is really little one can compare the MB to. The MB is not an ethnic or religious minority as the Whites were in South Africa. Islamists can, in a way, be considered a religious minority. But beyond an initial euphoric spate of teasing bearded men in the street immediately following 30/6, there is no sign that Islamists are being targeted in Egypt just because they are Islamists.

Instead, Egypt has decided to purge a secret Brotherhood whose membership, funds, and activities are all clandestine, and whose loyalties lie clearly outside the borders of the country. One might argue about the methods (and the appropriateness of their violence), the possibility of the purge succeeding, or even if it should be attempted. But one should not argue that we can use the same approach Mandela used to bring the MB into the fold. The MB has demanded nothing and continues to demand nothing in very explicit terms other than ruling Egypt and transforming it according to their cultist aspirations. The MB has no intention on becoming an open organisation, membership will remain secret, its internationalist pan-Islamic strain will remain integral, the sources of its income will remain mysterious, its fascist views on transforming society will remain integral.

I am all for calls to keep the authority in check while it is fighting its fight against the MB. And I think that signs like today's acquittal of hundreds of MB detainees by courts shows that the state apparatus still chooses to remain professional. However, I am completely against any illusion that reconciliation with the MB is desirable or even possible. Reconciliation between Islamists, mainstream Muslims, and Christians is a must. The destruction of the death cult called the MB, as an organisation, is a necessity.

Think of this as Egypt trying to get rid of its very old very disastrous KKK.

In vogue: Faux nostalgia

This video is supposed to show the progression of love songs directed at a male from a female from roughly the turn of the twentieth century to the present time. The moral we are expected to derive is that the classiness, the lyrics, and the melodies have all deteriorated horribly.

This photo is being exchanged as an example of how classy people were in royal Egypt. We are supposed to compare it to a modern Cairene coffee shop and come to the aforementioned conclusion.

This photo is, according to the person sharing it, a picture of students in King Fouad University (modern day Cairo University) in the thirties. Again, we are expected to contrast their progressiveness and wealth to today.

All three are but the tip of the iceberg in a years long trend of sharing pictures from the past in a nostalgic yearning to eras most people haven't even lived. The political undertone of the message is shared between all: There once was a golden age. However, the nostalgia is faulty. People are yearning back to times that never existed, using pictures to prove facts that were never true. 

The first video, for example is clearly comparing apples and oranges. Picking the ultimate classics from each decade, and then intentionally comparing them to the bottom drawer of pop-music in 2013. Counter-examples can be very easily formulated in which cabaret music from the twenties or monologues from the forties with nauseating lyrics are compared to wonderful exercises in classical and innovative Egyptian music from the present. But the comparison had to be drawn in a certain way to prove a certain point.

The photo of the coffee shop, Groppi, is another exercise in misleading. In fact the photo is a devastating indictment of royal Egypt and of modern audiences. The patrons of the coffee shop are obviously all non-Egyptian. Whether expats or naturalised, there isn't an ethnic Egyptian to be seen in sight. Even the waiter is most probably Nubian and is dressed in overstated quaint garb to give “ambience.” That modern Egyptians find inspiration in a picture that very obviously represents a colonialist system designed to segregate them is very telling.

The third picture is so misleading that it isn't even impressive. What is purported to be a picture in a public university in the thirties, is in fact a picture in an exclusivist private university in the sixties. Facts be damned.

So why are Egyptians doing all this? What’s the motive behind this campaign of self-deception? As I mentioned earlier, the aim is to search for a golden age. The myth of the Egyptian upper and upper middle class is that there was once a golden age in which everything was dandy and from then on everything went downhill. Internal conflict stems from when that golden age was. Was it royal Egypt? Nasserist Egypt? Sadat’s rule? But never Mubarak’s era. Mubarak has to be the downfall! Thus the proliferation of lower middle classes with their habits and behaviours on the beaches is not a sign that said class now has the capacity and the spending power to afford a vacation, it is rather a sign of how everything has deteriorated. Classism disguised as nostalgia.

But what the royalists, Nasserists, and Sadatists are missing is that they are all reminiscing about the same thing. Why is there a newfound and growing trend of yearning back to the eighties or even the early nineties? These are Mubarakist years that we should despise. What’s common between all the pictures of days bygone?

The answer lies in observing the trend. These nostalgic bouts come in bursts. The trend starts, grows, and then dies. It always starts the same way: photos of women looking extremely glad, wearing beautiful colourful dresses, without veils and with gorgeous hair. It doesn't matter what period the pictures are from (except the 80’s where they are unveiled but the hair isn't gorgeous) the focus is always on how the women look and act. Then voices seep in, subconsciously or consiously, intentionally or unintentionally the trend turns into pictures of panoramas, scenery, and generally human being-free vistas.

The conclusion is obvious. Egyptians are not yearning for a golden age of plenty and wealth, that never existed by the way. What they are reminiscing about is an era when society was free from the pressures and effects of political Islamism. People demand a time when they were truly happy, and truly safe, because society had not yet given in to clerics that turned women into violable sources of sexual gratification. Except most of the women sharing the pictures are veiled themselves and can’t for the life of them face the fact that they wish they could wear a dress in the street. So everyone gives in to the nudging of Islamists to go on a tangent and share pictures of Cairo skyline, damning Mubarak for wasting Egypt’s golden age of plenty.