أمينة و شهيرة و أم حنظلة

كان فيه زمان ناس عايشة مع بعض في عمارة. كان فيه عيلة الست أمينة و ولادها و دي كانت أكبر عيلة في العمارة. كان فيه كمان عيلة الست أم حنظلة. و كان فيه بنت شابة اسمها شهيرة قاعدة هي و صاحباتها معاهم في العمارة. أما عم جندي فده كان بواب العمارة اللي كل الناس اتفقوا انه راجل كويس و أمين.        

رئيس مجلس إدارة العمارة كان راجل كبير في السن و ابتدى يبقى بطئ و مبيجمعش. لكن طول ما هو ماسك العمارة كانت الأمور ماشية و بيعمل تجديدات و تصليحات من حين لآخر و الأمور مش بشعة. بالأخص ان العمارة كانت في منطقة لبش و فقيرة و بنت ستين كلب. كل العمارات اللي حواليهم كانت بتولع و حتت منها بتقع لكن عمارتهم في مكانها. متلصمة بس في مكانها.

و في يوم من الأيام شهيرة اللي لقت وظيفة في شركة ملتيناشونال قررت ان عمارتهم حالها يقرف و قالت ليه مانبقاش زي العمارات اللي في الحتت النضيفة. شهيرة قررت تشيل رئيس مجلس إدارة العمارة و نزلت الشارع و قعدت تردحله و تسبله الدين و تحدفه بالطوب. الأول كل اللي في العمارة قالولها الأمور متتخدش كده. لكن شوية و أم حنظلة نزلت مع شهيرة الشارع و قعدت تردح لرئيس العمارة معاها. عم جندي البواب نزل يحوش الاتنين و هو عينه على ست أمينة و ولادها. ست أمينة كانت ست طيبة و تخينة كده و شبه الأمهات و كانت خايفة قوي على ولادها. عم جندي شاف الخوف في عينها صعبت عليه و طلع يقنع رئيس العمارة يسيب البيت. 

رئيس اتحاد الملاك ساب الاتحاد. الست أمينة قالت لشهيرة و أم حنظلة ان عم جندي ممكن يمسك اتحاد الملاك شوية. شهيرة مركزتش معاهم لانها نكشت شعرها و رأسها و ألف جزمة تحبس رئيس العمارة القديم في البدروم. لما عم جندي حبسهولها قالت طب و السباك اللي كان بيجيبه ده حرامي ابن كلب. احبسهولي في البدروم و هاتلي كل اللي في جيوبه. حبسهولها. مسكت في الكهربائي. حبسهولها. و كل ما تمسك في حد أم حنظلة تقول انا لي واحد قريبي سباك ممتاز أجيبه مكانه. و شهيرة مركزة بس أنها تمسك في شعر كل الصنايعية القدام.

الست أمينة ابتدت تقلق من قرايب أم حنظلة اللي ممسكاهم كل حاجة. ابتدى صوتها يطلع لأول مرة. و ابتدى عم جندي يفرح ان صوتها بان. أم حنظلة جابت ازازة مولوتوف و نكشت شعرها و قالت لو معينتوش قرايبي انا هولع في العمارة كلها. و راحت قايلة لشهيرة ان العمارة حالها لسة مايل لان عم جندي اللي كان معينه هو رئيس مجلس الإدارة القديم. شهيرة فرشت لجندي الملاية و مسكت في هدومه و قالتله سيب العمارة لام حنظلة انا عايزاها هي عشان هي زيي و هعرف اتفاهم معاها. أم حنظلة قالتلهم و انا لو ما أخدتش إدارة العمارة هولع لكم فيها و النيعمة و علي و على أعدائي.

كالعادة جندي و أمينة خافوا على البيت و سلموا أم حنظلة الإدارة.

عم جندي قال النسوان دي كلها مجانين و طلع في الاوضة اللي فوق السطوح و قرر يربي حمام.

شهيرة كملت نكش شعرها و ردح و تحديف طوب على الناس. بس المرة دي أم حنظلة سلطتها على أمينة. شهيرة راحت و قعدت تسب و تلعن في أمينة و تقول لها يا شلتة يا كنبة يا اللي كنتي ماشية مع المدير القديم في الحرام يا بتاعة يالا نفسي يا عجوزة يا مفشولة انتي اللي مبيئة العمارة و قالبة ريحتها بالتقلية اللي بتطبخي بيها. أمينة قالت لها ايه يا بنتي الجنان ده. دا انا وولادي اللي شغالين ليل و نهار عشان نمشي البيت. إحنا اللي بنسقي الزرع و ننضف السلم و نجيب الحاجات من السوق وندهن السور و انتي قاعدة بقالك سنة بتحدفينا بالطوب و أم حنظلة بتهددني أنها هتولع في البيت.

المهم فاتت سنة إلا كام يوم. في الوقت ده أم حنظلة وقعت حته من السطوح و باعت الجنينة الورانية و فكت مواسير المية و باعتها و كسرت التمثال الرخام اللي في مدخل العمارة اللي كان بيفكرهم بزمن اجمل و جابت قرايبها خطفوا و قتلوا شوية من عيال أمينة و قلبت الدش اللي فوق السطوح مشنة عيش. و كل ما أمينة تشتكي أم حنظلة تهددها بحرق البيت و بقرايبها المجانين اللي في الجيهة الشرقية.

قبل الذكرى الأولى لتولي أم حنظلة الإدارة لاحظت هي و شهيرة تغييرات في أمينة. بدل ما أمينة كانت شبه آمال زايد في دور الأم ابتدت تدي على راقية إبراهيم في ريا و سكينة. و ابتدت تشتري جراكن بنزين جراكن بنزين جراكن بنزين و أمشاط كبريت أمشاط كبريت أمشاط كبريت. شهيرة احتارت. هي بتحب الأدرينالين و أمينة شكلها داخل على جنان لكن أمينة بتفكرها بأمها اللي هي أصلا هربانة من سلطتها.

أما أم حنظلة فاترعبت. و جريت على جندي تقول له الحق الولية اتجننت. جندي قال لها حلوها مع بعض، أنتوا زي بعض و انا دلوقتي اتفرغت لتربية الحمام و رسم اللوحات الفنية من المدرسة التكعيبية. نزلت أم حنظلة لأمينة جري و راحت مشغله لها اسطوانة انا هولع في البيت. أمينة مردتش و كملت شرى جراكن بنزين. أم حنظلة جابت قرايبها من أخر الشارع و عملت شادر فوق السطوح عشان تهد أمينة. أمينة كملت تجميع الجراكن. أم حنظلة راحت لها و قالت لها هعويرك و النيعمة و راحت ساحبة موس من تحت لسانها. أمينة أدتها كف لزقتها في الحيطة و كملت تجميع أمشاط الكبريت. أم حنظلة قالت لها يا حبيبتي اعقلي مش كده طب نتفاهم. ولا أي رد و أمينة كملت تجميع الجراكن. أم حنظلة راحت لشهيرة و قالت لها أوعي يا حبيبتي تنزلي مع الولية أمينة دي كبه و مشيها بطال. شهيرة قالت لها شور يا طنط بس عن إذنك عشان طنط أمينة بعتاني اجيبلها جراكن جاز.

أم حنظلة اترعبت. جندي ابتدت بطنه تكركب. شهيرة احتارت. حتى أمينة خافت من نفسها. محدش فيهم كان عارف يحدد قد ايه الوطيان و المر اللي أم حنظلة سقيته للعمارة في ظرف سنة ممكن يخلي أمينة و عيالها يتجننوا. و كلهم قعدوا يستنوا عشان يشوفوا.

أمينة و عيالها هيعملوا ايه

A prophet for all times and places?

Mainstream Islam maintains that the Muslim message is a message from God brought forth through the prophet Mohammed and that it is universal and applicable for all times and places. There are certainly some sticking points in the core message's universality when it is approached through rigid classical Islamic jurisprudence. But the sticking points are shockingly sparse when compared to the Bible. It is in "Sunnah" or prophetic tradition that Islam's claim to universality faces its real challenge.

Sunnah, or traditions of the prophet are a set of actions, habits, morals, and rituals that are attributed to the prophet Mohammed through his contemporaries. The science of "Hadith" or sayings of the prophet is highly involved, but also trapped in its own internal logic. The main interest of Hadith is canonizing those sayings of the prophet that are authentic and tracing their oral lines down to his contemporaries.

Through Sunnah, Islam gets some of its central rituals such as the Muslim prayers and the pilgrimage to Meccah. A lot of very critical components of Islamic theology and catechism are also derived from Hadith. But these days, the majority of daily references to Sunnah consider habits and traditions that affect daily life. These are not questions of morality or ethics, just issues of how one dresses or acts. Growing a beard is one example, dressing in a white gown and wearing sandals is another, eating with one's hands while sitting on the floor is a third. While the practice of these traditions is not mainstream in Egypt, their "righteousness" is considered a self-evident truth by the majority. And other, more diluted forms of such traditions are mainstream, for example wearing a Saudi style gown to Friday prayers instead of all the time, eating with one's right hands instead of eating on the floor, etc. In all cases, the righteousness of the tradition is based on the fact that the prophet did it.

These habits have become front and center issues for Islamists as Wahabism rose to the forefront of traditional Muslim societies. The MB, eager to adapt to any form of Islam that seems to be winning have adopted the centrality of these issues without adopting them, while Salafists have made them life and death issues. It becomes a complex issue of identity crisis, post-colonial complexes, and political maneuvering.

But at the end of the day, these superficial traditions pose a very serious question about the universality of Islam. The theory is that Islam is universal and true because it came directly from God and because its message is distilled and simple. As proof of this, the conflict between the message of Islam and the society in which it was delivered is always brought forward as proof. And one has to admit that if Islam were only a political and social movement intended for the Arabian nomads, its content would have been a lot less confrontational to them.

But the dress code, beards, and eating habits that Salafists proclaim as prophetic revelation were the norm in the society of Hijaz where the prophet delivered his message. The prophet did not wear thobes or grow his beard or eat with his hand sitting on the ground because there was anything sacred about any of that, it was because that's what everyone in his society did and had done for generations. These traditions were the most conformist and non-confrontational of anything that the prophet did. So if the eating and dress traditions of Arabia are to be considered sacred, then we have to consider the society of western Arabia before the prophet to be sacred and divinely inspired. For it was not the prophet, but his ancestors that made up these traditions. In other words, if the message of Islam were revealed in central China, would the prophet also have worn the dress of people in Western Arabia? Or would he have worn Chinese garb and eaten with chopsticks? In that case would Chinese dress and chopsticks be sacred traditions that all Muslims would have to follow? And would that make Chinese society sacred? If it is not possible that the prophet could have delivered his message in China or anywhere other than Western Arabia, then how is the message universal?

This may seem like a superficial issue, but if one digs deeper it is indicative of a serious crisis in Muslim societies. The mixing of Islam as a religion with Arabian habits and traditions is unprecedented in its depth and reach. And the impact on the faith of young Muslims is not always positive. Perhaps what Islam needs is a novel sort of fundamentalism, one that insists on purifying the religion back to its fundamental principles. Wahabism claimed to be doing so, sterilizing Muslim societies from Ottoman cultural traditions. What they did in effect was replace local cultural traditions, with which Islam coexisted for centuries, with the culture of the capital of Mohammed Bin Abd-Elwahab.

Paradigm shifts again

The paradigm of politics in Egypt has shifted multiple times within the last few years. Before the revolution of January 25^th, the people of Egypt perceived only one fault line: Government vs. everyone else. Immediately following the revolution, this perception shifted into revolutionary vs. reactionary. This continued till shortly before the presidential elections where the fault-line was artificially shifted into revolution vs. military\Mubarak regime remnants. I argued in a post before the elections that this fault line was untrue, and that the true division is and should be perceived as the division between those who want a modern (and yes secular) state, and those who want a nepotistic sectarian para-theocracy. This position was, of course, a tiny voice and it went unheard. The result was that revolutionaries, secular, and modern Islamist alike threw the country into the embrace of an ineffective, inbred, conservative mafia called the Muslim Brotherhood.

Now after the well expected cluster-failure of the MB, the fault lines are being redrawn. But this time it is significantly more complicated. Again there is an image similar to pre-2011 where there is the illusion of a division between those who are pro and those who are against the MB. But again, as with pre-2011 everyone is concentrating on what they don’t want (in this case the MB), not what they really want.

In this muddy environment few groups are clear on why they are aligning the way they are. There are some exceptions of course. Christians, despite MB protest to the opposite, are of course unanimously opposed to the MB staying in power. This might be partly because of the inescapable antagonism between an Islamist government and Christians, but any fair observer must have seen very material reasons for Christian dismay. MB sponsored progroms, murders that go unpunished, church burnings that go without investigation, the first ever recorded attack on the main Coptic cathedral (not to mention partly by the MoI), and continuous and consistent incitement against Copts in MB media outlets.

Another clear group is, of course, the MB cadre itself. How many there are is as much a secret as everything else about this cult. But MB commitment to their leaders is unwavering and religious. If Mohammed Morsi sinks the whole country, the MB membership will look to the supreme guide for their reaction, and they will copy it verbatim.

Everyone else in Egypt is in a more complicated situation. Why is it that the MB and some of the most solidly Mubarak-regimesque technocrats are on such good terms? Is there really a schism in the Salafist ranks, and would this schism encourage a Salafist to elect a liberal over an MB? Why have some of the most pro-Morsi “revolutionaries” become some of his worst enemies, while others are still unwavering in their support?

It all boils down to what people actually value and want. For the first time since the revolution, people are waking up to the fact that so far this revolution has all been about what they want to take apart and destroy, with no consensus on what anyone wants to build in its place. The exception of course, is the MB, who have always wanted to rebuild Egypt in the image of Hassan El-Banna’s home village.

So whether someone currently supports, is against, or is neutral towards the MB depends on the relative weight they put on several values. Top among these is freedom. Those who value freedom, as in the basic freedoms of people are of course aligned against the MB. This includes the majority of liberals and a section of progressive Islamists who in reality want a secular liberal democracy, but just want to name it and derive its values from non-western sources. Salafists and Islamists for whom infringement on the freedoms of others is a sacred right and duty may find themselves siding against the MB for being “too free” or siding with it because the liberals are much worse.

The second important value is order. People who put a high stake on order and rule of law would agains find themselves either siding with or against the MB. Perhaps they find that the MB’s repression is excusable in terms of the chaos that has struck the country. Yet others would find that the MB’s priorities and nepotism are the reasons for chaos and lack of rule of law.

The third and final value that most people consider before taking a position is stability. Yes, the dreaded S word of the Mubarak era. Egyptians are finally realizing that stability is not so bad, and that what Mubarak provided was indeed stability and not stagnation on so many fronts. Stability in a resource poor country like Egypt translates directly into money. Stability means more tourists, more investors, more jobs, higher salaries. And yes, it means that a guy would drive safely on the desert road to Alexandria to spend a very expensive vacations in Marina El-Alamein, and along the way they would stop to pay a tip to the guy in the parking lot of Masters. The revolution stated that it did not want the inequality between these two guys, what it delivered is a drop in the quality of life of both.

In the end each individual weighs these three factors and makes a very complex decision on why they do or don’t support the MB regime. The fault line will again be drawn and simplified by both sides and by the media as pro-MB vs. against-MB. But in reality neither camp is unified in what it wants. However, there are signs that this time, at least at the level of common folk, the question is starting to shift to: “What do we want” instead of “what do we not want”.

And therein lies the hope. 

Infidel hashtags: Atheist trend

Is atheism a trend in Egypt? What pushes Egyptian Muslims towards atheism? What is the traditional conservative Muslim intelligentsia doing in response. A few emerging Twitter hashtags help reveal some of the answers.

"There is a wave of atheism sweeping Egypt," this statement is often repeated online and in Egyptian talk shows, usually in the context of warning against the lash back on the push by Salafist clerics to reduce personal freedoms. Twitter has recently been flooded with hashtags that bring together Arab atheists. Hashtags with names like "diaries of an embarrassed X-Muslim" or the sarcastic "Islamic books that have benefited humanity."

The discourse on the hashtags reveals that atheism is probably just an elite phenomenon in Egypt, it has the potential to cause some very serious social disturbances, but it will by no means have any significant demographic impact in the near future. However, the logic for leaving Islam presented in these hashtags is very diagnostic and might be a pointer to major issues that Muslim societies will have to struggle with in the long run. Although the hashtags are meant for Arabs, the overwhelming majority of people posting are Egyptian Muslims with significant contributions from the Gulf and the Levant and noticeable absence of posts from North Africa. However, the issues raised are most likely common to all Arab countries.

First, what are the main reasons given for leaving Islam? These can be broken down into a few clear categories:

• Salafist fatwas: This is perhaps the largest category. Commentary on Salafist fatwas and their detachment from reality is sharp and clear. One can detect a level of  bitterness at Salafists for allegedly forcing some posters into a conflict with their own religion.
• Islamic history: The typical post would take an event from Islamic history where there was excessive use of violence, or excessive decadence and bring it to the forefront of the conflict. Foremost among the events are the Islamic conquests of the Middle East and North Africa and the great chasm that separates contemporary non-Islamic source accounts of the conquests from the common Muslim perception. But also very important are stories of the Sahaba, the companions of the prophet. Due to the near-prophetic stature Salafism has given to this group of people, they make very easy targets.
• Eccentricities of medieval jurisprudence (fiqh): The main issue here is the peculiar and specific nature of medieval jurisprudence and the useless tangents it seems to go into. This conflicts with the concept of Sunni Islam as a religion without a clergy. 
• Historicity of Quranic stories: This takes a leaf out of the book of criticism of the Bible. However, because the Quran is structured differently, the sharpness of the issue is less clear and thus this appears only as a side issue.
• Scientific "miracles" in the Quran:  What some well-meaning but ignorant Muslims think is a great way to strengthen faith turns out to be a surprisingly important component of many Muslims losing faith. While the Quran never claimed to be either a history or a science book, Muslims insist on forcing this role on it. Once exposed to any level of scientific scrutiny, the synthetic and contrived "scientific miracles" of the Quran fall apart instantly, bringing down with them the faith of many.
• Moral code: Polygamy, wife beating, slavery, female genital mutilation, inequality of sexes, persecution of minorities, and persecution based on ideas are major issues for many Egyptian "atheists." One person summarized his concern in a tweet (paraphrased): "If I live in a society that endorses pedophilia, persecutes minorities, considers the enslavement and rape of prisoners of war good, but is bothered by two adults having a private relationship, then I have a problem"

So are there any mainstream Muslim responses to these issues? The hashtags are naturally frequented by Muslims who respond, and again the responses can be broken down into a few major classes:

• This is not the right Islam: This forms the overwhelming majority of responses. The concerns X-Muslims have are dismissed as misunderstandings, aberrations, or myths. This is particularly effective when responding to concerns about Salafism or Islamic history but becomes foggy when the moral code and jurisprudence is concerned.
• You have to feel this not think about it: The issue is relegated to faith and lack thereof.
• You should be killed: A surprising number of tweets resort immediately to the controversial Islamic ruling on apostasy. As one "Sheikh" from the Gulf tweeted: "There is nothing like X-Muslim, there are Muslims and there are apostates who we should execute"

The bottom line is that the atheist hashtags are mostly sideline issues. Most Egyptian atheists are not actually concerned about denying the presence of God. In reality the majority are secular Muslims, deists, or at most agnostics. What really concerns most of the people forming the bulk of the "atheist wave" seem to be social and historical issues. Traditional Muslim society often responds by wading deep into said social and historical issues, trying to defend them as essential components of Islamic faith. What Muslims truly need in this respect is to purify the faith back to its essential form. This is, ironically, the original form of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by reformists such as Mohammed Abdu, before it was abducted by Sayyed Qutb, the founder of modern Islamic fundamentalism.

But it is in the moral code and basic rights that the truly serious clash is shaping out to be. Islamists of all shades are scrambling to establish a state that is neither liberal, nor secular, yet one that gives more rights and preserves more human dignity than a liberal democracy. Human experience, including our own indicates that this will fail. In all cases, however the state ends up looking like, Muslims as a society have to answer some major questions and settle once and for all their positions on: Gender equality, the morality of slavery (regardless of its practicality), use of violence (especially against women), freedom of expression (absolute and protected), and freedom of faith. How Muslim societies reach this, whether it is through radical reconstruction, or classical reinterpretation, is irrelevant. What truly matters is that we must catch up with the rest of humanity.

Broken feedback: Why democracy won't work in the Arab world

Democracy is cool. All of a sudden democracy is now supposed to be well and good according to Islamists. That's a far cry from the position their fathers took against democracy in royal Egypt. Back in the forties democracy was supposed to be an invention of infidels, an abomination beyond the pale. So what changed? Is it true that the Muslim Brotherhood now fully believes in democracy? The answer is that they do believe in elections, and they accept a lot of the mechanics of democracy, but this is where it ends.

What the west defines as democracy is necessarily liberal, secular democracy. Liberalism is a solid ideal that guarantees basic rights for everyone and full equality for all citizens. These basic principles are accepted by the absolute majority of the political spectrum in most countries. What Americans define as "Liberals" are no more committed to these basic rights than what Americans term "Conservatives." Secularism ensures that religious rights are preserved by separating structures of organized religion from the state. Again no significant political force in the US, for example, has any issues with secularism.

Liberalism ensures that democracy does not turn into mob rule. So amassing a majority does not allow said majority to control the basic rights and freedoms of the minority. Majorities and minorities are ideally political, reducing polarization and the survival mode the minority finds itself in when their rights are at the whim of the majority. Secularism ensures that arbitrary rules of one religion are not imposed upon followers of other religions or upon the state.

In the presence of liberalism and secularism democracy's only advantage is allowed to function: Self correction. If a government fails; whether the failure is economic, political, or social; the voters change it. If the government that follows is still bad, they can change it again. The terms "Liberal" and "Conservative" in the US refer essentially to economic left of center and right of center respectively (despite period eruptions of strawman arguments over abortion and gay marriage). Americans periodically switch between the two parties representing the two poles depending on the economic climate, public mood, or as punishment for poor performance.

Islamists in Egypt and the Arab world accept democracy as a mechanism of elections and majority rule. However liberalism as the granting of universal and equal rights to everyone is categorically refused. Secularism is not even open for question as far as all Islamists are concerned. The stated position is that liberal democracy is a western construct, and that Muslims should be allowed to fashion their own form of democracy which takes their cultural specificity into consideration.

However, in practice what this means is that democracy becomes a cyclical phenomenon of sectarianism, religious arguments, minority bashing, elections, then some more sectarianism and so on. Thus if the MB fails (as it is failing) to achieve any form of economic or political development of Egypt they will simply start a new episode of blaming Copts and Liberals for their failings and calling for more million man marches to "defend Islam." If the MB needs a law repealed or a law instituted or modified they can simply claim that it is in accordance/against Shariia and then claim that it isn't the MB that wants this law, but God. This happens to some degree or another in all countries. But what isn't common is that in Egypt a solid, ignorant, and impoverished majority will always bite the religious bait. The fascism and baseless supremacism combined with fatalism that the MB sells in time of need is something that a lot of Egyptians (and Arabs) are ready to buy. What is also unique to this brand of democracy is that in the absence of a constitution that guarantees full and equal rights to citizens, the ignorant majority always sees a very real chance to crush the minority scapegoats that keeps the MB bait fresh and alluring.

So the scary thing is, the MB can continue to be an utter failure, and continue to win elections and get majority support until Egypt is devastated beyond recognition.

This is all unfolding exactly as Egyptian Liberals expected, the real shock that's starting to set in is with intellectual moderate Islamists who dreamed of an idealistic brand of Islamic democracy only to be faced with the greasy failed fascism of the MB.

Twelve years later: A change of hearts

The difference between the reaction of normal Egyptians to 9/11 and their reaction to the Boston bombings is palpable. There is a definite change of hearts here, but it is not due to a shift in moral principles (which have always been dubiously detached from reality in Egypt), but due to self-serving interests. And perhaps this is a blessing because in Egypt, as anywhere else, it is interests that stick rather than ethics and values. For this we have the very unlikely personage of George W. Bush to thank, not for his horribly botched wars, but for some of the more subtle and unintentional fallout of 9/11.

When 9/11 happened, the majority of Egyptians were gleeful. A lot of Americanized Egyptians will bitterly contest this in English, but in Arabic they know it's a solid fact. But the way Fox News portrayed the glee was not true either. There were no parades in the streets, people did not scream "death to Americans" as they quoted verses from the Quran that dictated they had to "kill the infidels". In fact, the glee was mostly non-religious, and mostly confined to an ethics-free sense of synthetic pan-Arabism and perhaps pan-Islamism in an ethnic sense. As far as I can recall, very few outlying opinions tried to justify 9/11 based on religious grounds, but these were marginal, almost akin to the Westboro church in the US. The majority opinion maintained that killing civilians was wrong. And in typical Egyptian fashion, the majority opinion then marched on to completely ignore this moral principle and try to justify 9/11 based on America's deeds in the region. People thought of unconditional US support for Israel in its indiscriminate killings, and also of first hand low grade but indiscriminate US bombing campaigns in the Sudan and Afghanistan. The major sentiment of the day was "At least now Americans would understand the way we feel".

This logic is essentially broken. Comparison of targeting civilians to collateral damage is faulty. Both are horrific, but there is a fine moral distinction there. But above all, one wrong should never justify another horrible wrong. Ironically, it is in some of the more religious communities in Egypt that this moral principle was tightly observed and in which 9/11 was condemned unconditionally. But for the majority of Egyptians (and perhaps Arabs) values are theoretical constructs, to be admired and cherished from afar, but to be hermetically isolated from daily life.

When the Boston bombings happened, the reaction in Egypt was unanimous: "Please don't let it be a Muslim!" Perhaps the proper first reaction should have been concern for the victims, and encouragingly, there was a lot of that. But the bulk of the reaction was concern over the identity of the bomber. And I don't see much wrong with that. In fact, I think any other group of people in the same situation would've reacted the same way. And that's good news, because finally, at least in a small way Egyptians are becoming conscious of their image and interests and are starting to deal with the them in a "normal" way.

The reason for this shift in reaction from 9/11 to the Boston bombings is not the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact both wars (but Iraq a lot more so) validated some of the broken logic of the glee on 9/11. The main cause for the shift is more subtle yet more far-reaching. It is in the impossibly elongated US visa application process that the average citizen was touched. It is in being singled out in airports that most people felt their collective responsibility for 9/11. It is in the technology bans and business restrictions that professionals felt values and morals coalescing into something tangible. Accountability is not something Egyptians are used to, living in a decrepit nanny state, and it is in accountability for 9/11 that they had to own up for something for the first time.

Perhaps if all these restrictions had been imposed only by the US, the collective Arab mentality would have filed it under conspiracy theory. But as the official measures, and the distrustful looks of ordinary citizens spread all over the globe, the reality became undeniable. With the London and Madrid bombings, most Egyptians became aware (even if they would never state it openly) that our region is the main producer and exporter of terrorism in the world, and that we all have to pay for it in moral as well as in physical form. This then flowed into a real and heart-felt concern by a lot of Muslims for what some from their midst had done to the reputation of their religion.

So when it turned out that it was a Chechen 

Egypt's low budget Kristallnachts

Two Muslim children in a large village/small town in lower Egypt draw swastikas on a Muslim seminary school. Roughly a week later, the Orthodox cathedral in Abassiya is being attacked by Islamists, local thugs, and the Ministry of Interior. In any sane universe the two events should not be related. But in Egypt there is a direct causal relation between the two. For some reason, local Muslims were eager to consider the swastikas crosses. Naturally, they proceeded to burn down the local church. When local Christians tried to defend themselves, naturally local Muslims killed five of them, burned all Christian shops, and forced all other Christian families to move out of town. When the cathedral in Cairo tried to hold a funeral for those who were killed, local Muslims in Cairo were naturally offended that Christians held crosses in a funeral and proceeded to try to burn down the cathedral. The police, naturally, fired repeated volleys of bird shot and teargas into the cathedral.

This exercise in nonsense is unusually dramatic in its culmination at the traditionally state-protected cathedral, but in other respects it is not uncommon for Egypt. In fact, it has never been uncommon in Egypt through its history. Sectarian tension and stratification have been essential components of Egyptian society since the Arab conquest. The only exception to this is the Nasserite era, where honest to goodness secularism removed sectarian boundaries and suppressed extremism among both Muslims and Christians. To fight leftists, Sadat empowered political Islamists, leading to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the formation of groups on its right wing.

During the Mubarak era, the state essentially tried to keep sectarianism under wraps. There was a generally colorless nature to this effort as with everything in the Mubarak era. Security forces protected churches, even if half-heartedly. if sectarian clashes erupted, authorities tried to contain them, even if they exerted pressure on the victims (almost always Christian) to let go of their rights. High ranking appointments of Christians were often made, even if they had a token nature, and even if sectarianism ran amok at other levels of the bureaucracy. 

But during the Mubarak era, sectarianism or lack thereof completely left the realm of the regime. Large numbers of people working in and coming back to Egypt from Saudi Arabia reshaped the country in the nineties. Bringing back different levels of religious fundamentalism ranging from outright Saudi Wahabism to some sort of synthetic Egyptian televangelism (a la Amr Khaled), this returning diaspora reshaped the country. The veil spread, prayers became more a matter of social pressure than personal spirituality, personal freedoms were restricted by society through society, and a general wave of superficial religiosity washed over the Muslims of Egypt.

In parallel, Christians developed their reaction to this sweeping wave of Islamization. The end result by the early twenty first century is that a people who are essentially the same in ethnic and linguistic terms became two people. Look at a family, if the woman is not veiled and they don't look rich, they are Christian. If they look rich, look at the guy's wedding band, if it's Gold they are Christian. Suddenly, everyone on both sides of the fence needed to find out the religion of everyone around them.

The January 25th revolution was a complex issue for Christians. The former pope of the Coptic church was vocal in not supporting the revolution, and a lot of Muslims and Christians probably agree with him now in hindsight. But at the time, most Christians were also furious with the Mubarak regime for various (mostly unrealistic) reasons. So contrary to Islamist propaganda, most Christians supported the revolution. But the revolution brought about an Islamist regime. And to everyone's surprise the Islamist regime brought about the most obvious result for Christians: Violence, persecution, neglect, and injustice.

Many may claim that neglect and persecution were also there under Mubarak. The main difference is that with the MB it is institutional and official. Whereas under Mubarak progroms did happen once every few years, sometimes perpetrators were caught, and sometimes they were punished. Under the MB progroms happen almost every month and they are fanned and directed by local FJP and Salafist leadership publicly and in official media. Using Egypt's Christians as scapegoats for instability in the streets and blaming them for all the anti-Morsi rallies is a dangerous and well documented game among the MB's top leadership. And unlike the Mubarak era (or Sadata or Nasser or even the Alawy dynasty) the main Cathedral in Cairo is attacked, the attackers are videoed, and the police aids them, and nobody is held accountable for it. What the MB regime is saying is that they essentially don't care about Christians. They are not particularly going to directly target them. But if the MB needs a scapegoat, it will use the church. And if local salafists decide they want to burn down a church, the MB is not going to make a super effort to stop it.