The attack of the "Arab coalition" against the Houthi rebels in Yemen is a complicated endeavour in a complicated country with a very narrow window for a good return on investment. However, signals being given by Saudi Arabia indicate that this window will be missed, and that there will be significant self-inflicted damage in the process.
The official reason for the Arab intervention in Yemen is to provide aid to the legitimate government of Abd Rabou Mansour against armed rebel militias undermining the central government authority. Of course this reason ignores the fact that Mansour's regime enjoys very little popularity in Yemen, with significant rebellion among the Zaidi Shiia in the North, and a separatist streak in the South that has created a vacuum of such proportions that AQAP naturally flowed in to fill.
But on a semi official level verging on the official, the leading cause of the strikes is worry about the role that Iran plays in the region. This, at the very least, is more honest, and true. The Houthis represent a legitimate grievance of a large and marginalized section of the Yemeni population. But they also are loyal to Iran, they also have helped increase instability in Yemen, and they also have proved to be a direct threat to Saudi national security, not only in Yemen, but across the border. In that respect the Saudis have every right to interfere, this is one case where preemptive war is legitimately self-defence. But one has to wonder why Saudi Arabia is also not concerned about AQAP controlling large swaths of Hadhramaut.
The reason is where the real causes of the conflict lie and where western analysts are afraid the conflict might go. The worst kept secret in the world is that this is a chapter in a regional Suni-Shiite war that has engulfed the entire Mideast. And the fear is that this chapter will lead to an all-out war where the Gulf and Iran stop their proxy wars in the Levant and Iraq and start fighting face to face. And honestly, this is the narrative that Saudi Arabia is unknowingly knitting.
And it is Saudi Arabia, don't get it wrong. Only Saudi Arabia is fighting with any significant force in Yemen. All the Arab "support" was necessary window dressing to deny the accusation that the action was unilateral. Saudi Arabia wants to create a coalition of countries beyond the Arab League and the UN. A coalition of Sunni countries, thus the inclusion of Pakistan. A coalition of Sunni countries across political ideology, thus the inclusion of Sudan. A coalition of Arab countries that cross regional categories, thus the inclusion of Morocco. A coalition that would not say no to Saudi priorities of shaping the region into a fight against Iran, rather than a fight against extremism, thus the tepidness towards Egypt. This coalition must have the "willingness" to follow Saudi Arabia. A coalition of the willing.
Yes, the parallels are uncanny. Saudi Arabia is the US in 2003. And Egypt is incapable of deciding if it wants to be Germany in 2003 or the "there's also Poland" of 2003. The euphoria in Saudi Arabia is extreme. Adding to it is the factor of surprise. The Saudi army has a reputation for being over-equipped, under-trained, ineffective, and unexperienced. Yemen was a surprise. A wonderful surprise for the Saudis. The initial glee of air superiority and intelligence supremacy was a shock not only to the Houthis, or to the region, or even the world; it was a surprise to the Saudis. In a country with a young population, an identity crisis, and an ageing royal family, this sparked a wave of patriotism and pride that is perhaps unprecedented.
Adding to the pride is that the action is unilateral. Saudi Arabia did it without asking anyone for permission or for help. And the response from the world was not only one where nobody dared object, but where everyone raced to obsequiously offer aid and support. The diplomatic supremacy was more than matched by media hegemony. You could bomb a UN refugee shelter and even Fox News would cover it less than when Israel bombs UN shelters in Gaza. This is war between two rivals so grossly unmatched that it's laughable.
Or so it seems. The aerial bombing hasn't demonstrably had a measurable impact on Houthi-Mansour dynamics on the ground. They might, but they haven't, and they are not likely to. Meanwhile, a bitterness is being created among Yemenis about the destruction of their country and the collateral damage that will only cause Saudis problems for decades. Of course this bitterness is not appearing on international media, let alone Arab media. And as usual, in its focus on fighting Iran-backed militia, Saudi Arabia is casually brushing aside the role that Al-Qaeda and extremist Sunnis are playing in filling the vacuum. Saudi Arabia seems totally oblivious to the prospect of an ISIL on both its periphery.
But the biggest threat to Saudi Arabia is Saudi Arabia. The pride, and weird novel strain on sectarian nationalism developing there are ominous. Again, echoes of a 2003 US. I can see Saudis already concluding success and ease of success in Yemen. This is a collective "Mission Accomplished" moment of epic misguidedness. The main danger here is that Saudis will conclude from their apparent victory in Yemen that they can unilaterally shape the region in their image. They will take this and proceed to another "storm of resolve" in both Iraq and Syria, trying to leverage the momentum of Yemen. But again, I believe this momentum will mostly be intangible. And again the coalition that Saudi Arabia imagines will back it in a regional Sunni Shiia war does not even exist. Saudi Arabia can easily find itself entangled in a Vietnam and an 2003 Iraq simultaneously. And since Saudi Arabia can't nation build at home, it can't nation build in Yemen and the Levant. The results can only be a legendary clusterf*ck.
Saudis should be very careful of what their aims are. They should bomb only enough to get all sides in Yemen to some sort of negotiating table in Oman. They should not try to bomb the Houthis into oblivion or submission. And they most certainly should not give in to the mass hysteria leading them to believe that they can impose some kind of Pax Saudiana where they recreate the region to their liking and impose a peace and a regional sphere of influence.
