One last time the paradigm has to shift again. But this time it draws a fault line along non-ideological grounds that are also much deeper and much closer to the nature of Egypt than the revolutionary-regime ancien fault line or the theocrat-secular one, both ultimately unnatural in the Egyptian context.
The new fault line is based on logic, reality, the possible, realism, and facts. It is between those who, after three years of demanding instantaneous change and not getting it, finally realise that Egypt's problems are too deep to be changed by simple conscious decisions by leadership. And between those who still insist that "the revolution had aims" and that "these aims are simple to achieve" without contributing anything on how they are simple or how anyone is supposed to achieve them.
In a way it is a division based on means but not necessarily ends. On both sides there will be people brought together who have different aims but who share an agreement on the methods. This is not new, in fact, it is the main ailment of the Egyptian revolution. But this time it is essential that this sorting takes place.
In the camp of reality are people who realise that Egypt is in grave danger. They realise that the country is not rich, that its priorities currently and in the foreseeable future is not establishing the trappings of a Western democracy. This is the camp that has gotten rid of the myth of a "rich Egypt whose resources are constantly being stolen." This is a camp that can no longer be blackmailed into not shouting that stability and security are priorities. This is a camp that believes the state in Egypt is in very grave danger, and not necessarily because of bad leadership, but also because of large scale unchecked chaos and rewarded bad behaviour over three years.
In this camp are "revolutionaries" who simply wanted and believed possible a sudden and clear improvement in the country after the removal of Mubarak, but who soon realised that the methods used by the revolution post the eighteen days were not helping improve the country in any way. The camp includes "felool", the umbrella term used to describe people who rejected the January revolution for a variety of reasons. It will also include Islamists, many of them who still believe that Morsi was brilliant and that there was a global conspiracy against him. But they also recognise they and their children live in this country and that if it sinks they will sink with it. They probably detest the loss of the Islamist state, but they see only catastrophe in trying to force an "Islamic revolution" down the throat of a country that clearly refuses it.
This camp will not necessarily vote as a block. They won't necessarily agree on much. But at different junctures they will try to pull the country towards gradual change. They will try to restore normalcy, they will push towards a more technocratic form of government and will try to abandon the ideologies that destroyed the country. And for that they will again be labelled felool.
The second camp is the camp that insists there must be immediate change and that any means to reach such immediate change is allowed and desirable. In a way this camp agrees that the country must be completely deconstructed. The motive is either to prove a point or to rebuild it again in a form that they see fit. Realism and resources, the fate of the people in the case of such upheaval, and the possibility of even achieving it are all irrelevant.
This camp also includes revolutionaries. Activists who believe that the current regime (not withstanding that one barely exists) is criminal and must be dissolved. The alternative is, as it has always been, irrelevant. But there are also revolutionaries who simple want the state to fail so utterly and completely just to prove a point: That they were right. How they happen to have been right is again irrelevant. Perhaps the Islamists in this camp are clearer. They want to destroy the state in order to prove that removing Morsi was wrong and in order to start an Islamic state from scratch. Insane, but at least there is more internal logic to it than the revolutionaries. And a lot more logic than the felool who belong to this camp, the bunch that wants failure just in order to laugh at everyone and say that Mubarak was right.
It is a new fault line that separates those who want to look forward from those who want to cling to the near past. Except that due to the twisted logic of Egypt those who want to look forward happen to be the conservatives in every old ideological camp.
It is also a final fault line. Egypt doesn't have any more chances. If camp 1 wins then the country may be back on a track that restores employment, investment, and livelihood. If camp 2 wins then we are in for a few years of labour protests, violent street clashes, assassinations, followed by the dissolution of the army and massive loss of life as the revolution finally achieves its anarchic utopia.
Good luck Egypt.
The new fault line is based on logic, reality, the possible, realism, and facts. It is between those who, after three years of demanding instantaneous change and not getting it, finally realise that Egypt's problems are too deep to be changed by simple conscious decisions by leadership. And between those who still insist that "the revolution had aims" and that "these aims are simple to achieve" without contributing anything on how they are simple or how anyone is supposed to achieve them.
In a way it is a division based on means but not necessarily ends. On both sides there will be people brought together who have different aims but who share an agreement on the methods. This is not new, in fact, it is the main ailment of the Egyptian revolution. But this time it is essential that this sorting takes place.
In the camp of reality are people who realise that Egypt is in grave danger. They realise that the country is not rich, that its priorities currently and in the foreseeable future is not establishing the trappings of a Western democracy. This is the camp that has gotten rid of the myth of a "rich Egypt whose resources are constantly being stolen." This is a camp that can no longer be blackmailed into not shouting that stability and security are priorities. This is a camp that believes the state in Egypt is in very grave danger, and not necessarily because of bad leadership, but also because of large scale unchecked chaos and rewarded bad behaviour over three years.
In this camp are "revolutionaries" who simply wanted and believed possible a sudden and clear improvement in the country after the removal of Mubarak, but who soon realised that the methods used by the revolution post the eighteen days were not helping improve the country in any way. The camp includes "felool", the umbrella term used to describe people who rejected the January revolution for a variety of reasons. It will also include Islamists, many of them who still believe that Morsi was brilliant and that there was a global conspiracy against him. But they also recognise they and their children live in this country and that if it sinks they will sink with it. They probably detest the loss of the Islamist state, but they see only catastrophe in trying to force an "Islamic revolution" down the throat of a country that clearly refuses it.
This camp will not necessarily vote as a block. They won't necessarily agree on much. But at different junctures they will try to pull the country towards gradual change. They will try to restore normalcy, they will push towards a more technocratic form of government and will try to abandon the ideologies that destroyed the country. And for that they will again be labelled felool.
The second camp is the camp that insists there must be immediate change and that any means to reach such immediate change is allowed and desirable. In a way this camp agrees that the country must be completely deconstructed. The motive is either to prove a point or to rebuild it again in a form that they see fit. Realism and resources, the fate of the people in the case of such upheaval, and the possibility of even achieving it are all irrelevant.
This camp also includes revolutionaries. Activists who believe that the current regime (not withstanding that one barely exists) is criminal and must be dissolved. The alternative is, as it has always been, irrelevant. But there are also revolutionaries who simple want the state to fail so utterly and completely just to prove a point: That they were right. How they happen to have been right is again irrelevant. Perhaps the Islamists in this camp are clearer. They want to destroy the state in order to prove that removing Morsi was wrong and in order to start an Islamic state from scratch. Insane, but at least there is more internal logic to it than the revolutionaries. And a lot more logic than the felool who belong to this camp, the bunch that wants failure just in order to laugh at everyone and say that Mubarak was right.
It is a new fault line that separates those who want to look forward from those who want to cling to the near past. Except that due to the twisted logic of Egypt those who want to look forward happen to be the conservatives in every old ideological camp.
It is also a final fault line. Egypt doesn't have any more chances. If camp 1 wins then the country may be back on a track that restores employment, investment, and livelihood. If camp 2 wins then we are in for a few years of labour protests, violent street clashes, assassinations, followed by the dissolution of the army and massive loss of life as the revolution finally achieves its anarchic utopia.
Good luck Egypt.
